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TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE:
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL, THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE,
AND PRETRIAL DISCOVERY IN
CRIMINAL CASES
Jenny Roberts*
Where money is involved, all parties receive all relevant infor-
mation from their adversaries upon request; but where individ-
ual liberty is at stake, such information can be either withheld
by the prosecutor or parceled out at a time when it produces the
least benefit to the accused.'
INTRODUCTION
You are an attorney for the Criminal Defense Division of the
Legal Aid Society in Manhattan, and you go into Criminal Court to
work an arraignment shift. The folder with your next client's
case-her name is "Jane Smith" 2-contains only one piece of pa-
per related to the charge: the Criminal Court Complaint. It lists
the charge of Grand Larceny and offers only the following facts:
that at around 1:00 p.m. on August 1, 2003, near the corner of
Third Avenue and Twenty-third Street, "a person known to the
District Attorney's office" informed the police that "Jane Smith
did steal $3,500" from her. Your client has little information to add
because she is innocent. She has no idea what this is about. She
only vaguely remembers where she might have been at the time, as
* Acting Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I am
grateful to the Lawyering Program faculty at NYU, and in particular to Mary Hol-
land, Babe Howell, and Juliet Stumpf for their support and very helpful comments. I
also benefited greatly from comments from Rachel Barkow, Adele Bernhard, Jerome
Bruner, Jerome Cohen, Peggy Davis, Randy Hertz, Jim Jacobs, Youngjae Lee, Holly
Maguigan, Jerry Skolnick, and the NYU criminal law lunch group members. Rachel
Lerner and particularly Lauren Cusick provided invaluable research assistance. A
special thanks to Andrew Benepe for his support as I worked on this article.
1. Hon. H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent? Restric-
tions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1089, 1089 (1991).
2. This case is based loosely on a real case from my past practice as a Staff Attor-
ney at the Legal Aid Society, Criminal Defense Division, New York County. All
names have been changed. See infra text accompanying notes 149-192 for a full dis-
cussion of Jane Smith's case.
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the date was more than three months ago. And that one piece of
paper, which does not give you the name of the complaining wit-
ness, is almost all of the information you will get in this case until
seven months later on the morning the trial begins. It is all the
information you receive because the statute governing discovery in
New York State is highly restrictive and requires little disclosure of
information meaningful to the ability to investigate until it is too
late. For example, discovery that is as central as police reports con-
taining statements of trial witnesses is mandated only after the jury
is sworn.3
Unlike rules governing discovery in civil cases, which require
that the two sides exchange most information about their respec-
tive cases,4 criminal discovery result in a much more limited flow of
information. Many commentators, for many years, have called for
the liberalization of criminal discovery statutes and rules. 5 Indeed,
some states have heeded the call. Florida allows defense counsel
to depose prosecution witnesses;6 New Jersey has long had broad
3. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45 (McKinney 2002). To illustrate the difficulties
defendants face under the restrictive federal discovery rules, Sarokin and Zuckerman
offer the following excerpt of defense counsel's pretrial argument:
I would like to put it in context for the court very briefly. From what I know
about the case, and what I don't know because I think it would help you
evaluate our request for a bill of particulars, this is a situation where my
client was not arrested in possession of anything, no search [was] conducted
of his car which produced any evidence.
As far as I know, there is no electronic surveillance or other surveillance. I
have been given nothing specific at all. I have a charge that says in or about
October of '88, which doesn't limit it to the month of October, he allegedly
possessed some methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Not told where
or with whom or under what circumstances....
My client is presumed innocent. The Government shouldn't be saying that
the defendant since he must be guilty must know what he is accused of do-
ing. I have no idea what he is accused of doing, and he doesn't know what
kinds of proofs the Government intends to offer. I think under the circum-
stances we should be given more.
Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 1, at 1092-93, 1095 (citing district court
proceedings).
4. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
5. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or
Quest For Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 Brennan]; Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest For Truth? A Pro-
gress Report,, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Brennan]; Sarokin &
Zuckerman, supra note 1, at 1089 (noting that "[i]t is an astonishing anomaly that in
federal courts virtually unrestricted discovery is granted in civil cases, whereas discov-
ery is severely limited in criminal matters"); Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost & Found
in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 228 (1964).
6. FLA. R. CRIM. PROC. 3.220(h)(1)(A) (2003).
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discovery rules.7 Around one-third of the states have relatively
broad discovery rules or statutes, modeled on American Bar Asso-
ciation standards.8 But about a dozen states follow the highly re-
strictive federal rule, which is premised in part on the idea that a
defendant should not be entitled to witness names or statements
for pretrial investigation, but rather only for cross-examination
purposes should the case ever get to that stage.9 The remaining
states fall between the two models. 10
New York is on the restrictive end of the spectrum. As Smith's
attorney, you need to investigate the case; indeed, you are aware
that you have a constitutional duty to do so." But just about all
you can do, with the limited information you have, is to visit a
vaguely-defined crime scene in a very busy area of Manhattan.
This is your situation right up until the start of the trial.
Jane Smith has a right, under the Sixth Amendment, to the "ef-
fective assistance of counsel."12 Investigation of the prosecution's
case and possible defenses has long been recognized as a core func-
tion of defense counsel in a criminal case, one that is necessary to
the testing of the facts in our adversarial system. 13 This function
has been consitutionalized as the Sixth Amendment duty to "make
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary."' ' Yet does the rep-
resentation of Jane Smith ensure an adversarial testing of the facts
so as to protect against conviction of the innocent even while con-
victing the guilty? Is the quantum of investigation that the discov-
ery rules allow defensible under the constitutional principle that
7. N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(c)(6) (2003).
8. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §20.2(b), at 916 (3d ed.
2000); see also AM. BAR ASS'N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 1 (approved
draft, 1970) [hereinafter STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY].
9. See LAFAVE, supra note 8, §20.2(b), at 916; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (relay-
ing discovery rules for criminal cases and noting that discovery of government witness
statements is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3500); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (2000) (stat-
ing that the recorded statement of a government witness must be provided to a defen-
dant only after the witness has testified on direct examination at trial).
10. LAFAVE, supra note 8, §20.2(b), at 916.
11. See infra Part II.A discussing the duty to investigate.
12. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (stating that "[i]t has
long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel"); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 28-61 & 106.
14. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (establishing two-prong test
to make a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment). In
this article, "duty to investigate" means the standard as enunciated in Strickland.
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adversarial testing cannot take place without defense counsel's in-
dependent investigation of the facts? The right to effective assis-
tance of counsel rings hollow when restrictive discovery rules
render an attorney unable to investigate the facts of the case.
There are clear connections among the effective assistance of
counsel, the duty to investigate and discovery. It is the aim of this
article to both explore those connections and to urge a Sixth
Amendment analysis of restrictive discovery rules. This article de-
scribes how restrictive discovery rules block the delivery of effec-
tive assistance of counsel when defense counsel has insufficient
information to investigate the case. The Supreme Court has not
undertaken this type of analysis; it has considered discovery almost
exclusively through the lens of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 5 Scholarship on discovery also largely fails to ex-
plore the validity of restrictive discovery under such a Sixth
Amendment analysis.16
15. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also infra Part III.B.
16. See, e.g., Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 1. Judge Sarokin and William
Zuckerman recognize that "[t]he failure to provide full disclosure of the government's
case early in the proceedings limits a defendant's ability to investigate the background
and character of government witnesses and the veracity of their testimony." Id. at
1090. Noting that discovery restrictions "impinge upon the right of defendants to a
fair trial," id., the authors claim that liberalization of discovery is a "task for the legis-
lature," and give only brief attention to the potential constitutional bases for an ex-
panded right to discovery. Id. at 1108. They state simply that "[tihe call for a
constitutional right of discovery is compatible with the holding in Brady," and note
that "the fact that many prosecutors choose to open their files to opposing counsel
raises the additional issue of equal protection." Id. at 1107. Similarly, Justice Bren-
nan acknowledged the need for broad discovery for defendants for investigatory pur-
poses, but did not link that need to the constitutional right to effective assistance. See
1990 Brennan, supra note 5. Justice Brennan claimed that the American Bar Associa-
tion's Standards for Criminal Justice, which recommended a rule of open file discov-
ery, stated the "bare minimum of discovery that should be required." Id. at 11. He
noted that such standards would "certainly improve a defendant's opportunity to in-
vestigate evidence, to interview witnesses, and in general to prepare for trial," and in
fact claimed that even broader discovery was necessary to allow for adequate investi-
gation in several specific areas. Id. at 12. He never articulated, however, a constitu-
tional basis for his claims, noting only generally that "[t]he proper guide to discovery
practices should not be the likelihood that disclosure in a particular case will save the
trouble of a trial, ... but the degree to which discovery will enhance the reliability of
factfinding." Id. at 2-3.
Some of the literature notes, but does not closely examine, the connection between
discovery and the right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Cary Clennon,
Pretrial Discovery of W Lists: A Modest Proposal to Improve the Administration of
Criminal Justice in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 38 CATH. U. L.
REv. 641, 668-74 (1989) (discussing the relationship between pre-plea discovery and
the effective assistance of counsel on a practical level but noting that "discovery itself
is not even a constitutional right"); Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jencks
Witness Statements: Timing Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 651, 695 (1999)
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Reconsideration of the discovery framework is timely for two
reasons. First, the Supreme Court has given much more vigor to
defense counsel's Sixth-Amendment-based duty to investigate in
two recent decisions which reversed death sentences: Williams v.
Taylor,I7 in which, for the first time, the Supreme Court found inef-
fective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel's inadequate
investigation, 18 and Wiggins v. Smith. 9 In its 2003 decision in Wig-
gins, the Supreme Court found that defense counsel's paltry inves-
tigation into mitigation evidence for Wiggins's capital sentencing
hearing did not comport with "prevailing professional norms. "20
(noting ABA Rules of Professional Conduct and Standards for Criminal Justice in
stating that "defense counsel is at a serious disadvantage in performing his or her role
as an effective advocate when information for trial preparation is not provided or
delayed" (footnotes omitted)); see also Linda S. Eads, Adjudication By Ambush: Fed-
eral Prosecutors' Use of Nonscientific Experts in a System of Limited Criminal Discov-
ery, 67 N.C. L. REV. 577 (1989). Eads, in the context of critiquing the federal rules
that inhibit discovery of nonscientific expert materials, undertakes a brief survey of
potential constitutional bases for challenges to the federal discovery rules as they re-
late to nonscientific expert witnesses. Id. at 612-21. Eads briefly lists two potential
arguments for broader discovery under the Sixth Amendment right to effective assis-
tance. Id. at 617-18. She concludes, however, that such claims would be hard to win,
that they could be made only in a limited number of cases, and that "[s]uch an expan-
sion of constitutional rights into the area of criminal discovery has implications for the
entire criminal justice system that may not be in the best interest of society as a
whole." Id. at 618. The focus of Eads' article is thus on addressing "the deficiencies
in the procedural rules themselves rather than [on arguing] to expand constitutional
protections into the area of criminal discovery generally." Id.
The notable exception is Anthony Amsterdam's reporting in 2 TRIAL MANUAL 5
FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES (1989 ed.) [hereinafter TRIAL MANUAL 5],
where he leads off the section on constitutional concerns relating to discovery with
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. § 270. In the manual, Amsterdam argues
that right-to-counsel claims could be based on defense counsel's inability to prepare
adequately for a case without pretrial discovery. Id. This argument is developed only
briefly and was articulated prior to recent Supreme Court decisions on the duty to
investigate. See infra text accompanying notes 58-62 and Part II.B. Still, the argu-
ment is the core claim of this article-that a right-to-counsel analysis should inform
constitutional claims about discovery.
17. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
18. Id. at 371.
19. 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003). Coming three years after the decision in Williams v.
Taylor, the Wiggins Court also granted the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance
based on investigatory failures. Id. at 2536-37; see also Supreme Court 2002 Term,
Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 278, 278 (2003) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (not-
ing that "[a]fter nearly twenty years," the standard governing claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel that was announced in "Strickland v. Washington has finally
been given teeth").
20. Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2535. Both Williams and Wiggins address failures to
investigate mitigation evidence at a capital sentence hearing. The constitutional prin-
ciples articulated in the cases, however, apply equally to investigation at the guilt/
innocence phase in non-capital cases. See infra text accompanying notes 107-09.
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The trial attorneys in Wiggins had the tools at their disposal to do
the necessary investigation; records in their possession suggested a
very troubled childhood. They simply failed to investigate this
avenue.
21
In many cases, such as that of Jane Smith, defense counsel do not
have the tools to investigate the facts because their clients cannot
give them the information they need to begin an investigation.
This situation is presented most starkly with an innocent defen-
dant, who knows nothing about the facts of the case against him
and thus has no information to share.2 2 How can counsel investi-
gate enough to make informed choices about trial defenses when
the client can say no more than "I know nothing about these
charges"? The assumption that the defendant has enough informa-
tion about the case to allow for investigation flies in the face of the
constitutional right to a presumption of innocence.23
While the problem of acquiring adequate information for investi-
gation in the case of an innocent defendant presents a compelling
example that resonates with our notions of fundamental fairness in
the adversary system, the problem exists well outside of the inno-
cence context. Assuming that defense counsel can garner all neces-
sary information from her client ignores the fact that many
defendants suffer from mental illness or retardation, drug or alco-
hol abuse, impaired memory, and other impediments which might
prevent them from being an adequate, sole source for investigative
21. In Wiggins, the attorneys not only had the information at their disposal, they
also had the means to use the information, as their office had funds to hire an expert
to prepare a social history of Wiggins. Id. at 2536. In some cases, the attorneys have
the information at their disposal but cannot make use of it due to caseload pressure,
lack of resources, and other systemic obstacles. As noted infra note 111 and accom-
panying text, recognizing such systemic problems, this article focuses on the stage of
obtaining information in situations where defense counsel does not have enough to
undertake adequate investigation.
22. While defendants may learn some of the facts of the case from the arresting
officer or other law enforcement officials during the arrest process, such information
would rarely, if ever, rise to the level of specificity necessary for investigation. In
addition, since law enforcement can and does lie to defendants in the course of inter-
rogation, it would be difficult for defense counsel to know what information she could
rely on from such a source.
23. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477-78 (2000) (explaining that
"[t]aken together.... [Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment] rights indisputably entitle a
criminal defendant to a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the
crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt" (internal quotation omit-
ted)); see also 1963 Brennan, supra note 5 at 287 (questioning "does not the denial of
all discovery set aside the presumption of innocence-is not such denial blind to the
superlatively important public interest in the acquittal of the innocent?").
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leads.24 It also assumes that the defendant (even one who is guilty)
possesses specific information, such as names and addresses of po-
tential witnesses, which is necessary for defense counsel to ade-
quately investigate the case. It ignores the fact that incarcerated
defendants cannot bring their attorneys to relevant people or
places when they lack this information, and instead, perhaps only
know someone by nickname or by sight. Certainly, attorneys faced
with these obstacles must also investigate the case in order to fulfill
the promise of effective assistance under the Sixth Amendment, be
that in a trial or in appropriately counseling a client in the context
of a plea bargain.25 The right to effective assistance is not contin-
gent upon innocence.26
The second reason that reconsideration of the analytic frame-
work for discovery is timely is that the recent' debate over fairness
in the death penalty has led to a greater understanding of the
causes of wrongful convictions and to the identification of inade-
quate investigation as a core cause. This is perhaps the driving
force behind the Court's renewed attention, in Williams and Wig-
gins, to failures to investigate. If adequate investigation can help
protect against wrongful conviction, then courts must give the con-
stitutional duty to investigate real meaning by giving defense coun-
sel the discovery they need in order to investigate.
The role that discovery can play in advancing the goals of thor-
ough investigation has not received the attention it deserves: as a
mechanism to advance full airing of well-developed facts in an ad-
versarial proceeding or within a plea bargain process where each
side investigates enough so that there is some adversarial testing.
While discovery that is broad enough and early enough in the case
24. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (acknowledging that
"[m]entally retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to
their counsel"); United States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763, 767 (3d Cir. 1987) (describing
doctor's testimony, with respect to defendant who abused cocaine for sixteen years
prior to as well as during his trial, "that cocaine addiction would affect a defendant's
capacity to confer effectively with counsel"); Melinda G. Schmidt et al., Effectiveness
of Participation as a Defendant: The Attorney-Juvenile Client Relationship, 21 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 175 (2003).
25. See Impact of Problem Solving on the Lawyer's Role and Ethics, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1892, 1919 (2002) (discussing lawyer's duty to investigate before counseling
client regarding a plea). See generally Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead:
Effective Assistance & Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841 (1998).
26. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986) (noting that "[t]he con-
stitutional rights of criminal defendants are granted to the innocent and the guilty
alike").
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to allow for investigation is clearly not a panacea,2 7 it is a low-cost
and simple solution to one large obstacle to the effective assistance
of counsel. Given Williams and Wiggins, and lessons about the
need for adequate investigation to protect against wrongful convic-
tion, it is important to consider how restrictive discovery can vio-
late the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Courts-and
legislatures-should build on the momentum of Wiggins to recog-
nize that investigation is one of the core functions of defense coun-
sel. It is a defining feature that gives meaning to the effective
assistance of counsel. It is time to take the next logical step toward
understanding how defense counsel's investigative ability is inextri-
cably intertwined with the constraints that the discovery process
places on defense counsel's access to information.
In Part I, this article explores defense counsel's duty to investi-
gate in the context of the Sixth Amendment and considers the
cases defining the duty. It focuses on Wiggins to demonstrate how
the Supreme Court has recently given new force to the duty to in-
vestigate. Part II links the duty to the discovery process and re-
turns to the case of Jane Smith to understand how restrictive
discovery statutes, such as those in New York, block the effective
assistance of counsel. Part III summarizes the purpose of pretrial
discovery in criminal cases and discusses why the three major con-
tentions in support of restrictive discovery-likely perjury by the
defendant, lack of reciprocity in the discovery process, and poten-
tial witness intimidation-lack validity. This article concludes by
suggesting that the prophylactic rule of open file discovery is an
appropriate remedy for the constitutional conflict between the
duty to investigate and state barriers to the information necessary
to carry out that duty.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL'S SIXTH
AMENDMENT DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
A criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right "to have the As-
sistance of Counsel for his defence"28 is the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel.2 9 The underlying purpose of this right is to allow
"the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the cruci-
27. A meaningful duty to investigate, and the discovery necessary to give it real
teeth, would be only a starting point. As acknowledged infra note 111 and accompa-
nying text, there are a number of systemic obstacles, such as insufficient investigatory
resources, that could also obstruct the duty to investigate.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
29. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
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ble of meaningful adversarial testing."3 In other words, the right
to effective assistance advances the same goal as that of the crimi-
nal justice system more generally: fairness within the adversary
process, with the ultimate objective that the guilty are convicted
and the innocent are acquitted.3'
A. The Central Role Investigation Plays in Providing Effective
Assistance of Counsel
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of fact de-
velopment in criminal cases, noting that:
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is
both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal jus-
tice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a
partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integ-
rity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system
depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework
of the rules of evidence.32
Such fact development cannot take place without investigation. In
turn, adversarial balance cannot take place without investigation
by both the prosecution and the defense. Thus, defense counsel's
duty to investigate rests on the recognition of pretrial investigation
as "perhaps, the most critical stage of a lawyer's preparation. '33
30. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984); see also Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) ("The right to counsel plays a crucial role in the
adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's skill
and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the 'ample opportunity to meet the
case of the prosecution' to which they are entitled" (quoting Adams v. United States
ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1942))).
31. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 655-56; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 ("The
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's con-
duct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result"); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S.
853, 862 (1975) (remarking that "[t]he very premise of our adversary system of crimi-
nal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the
ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free").
32. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); see also Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400, 408-09 (1988).
33. House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 618 (11th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 735 (3rd Cir. 1970) which
noted that:
Adequate preparation for trial often may be a more important element in
the effective assistance of counsel to which a defendant is entitled than the
forensic skill exhibited in the courtroom. The careful investigation of a case
and the thoughtful analysis of the information it yields may disclose evidence
of which even the defendant is unaware and may suggest issues and tactics at
trial which would otherwise not emerge.
1106 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
As early as 1932, in its first decision explaining the right to coun-
sel, the Supreme Court linked the right to the investigative func-
tion of defense counsel. In Powell v. Alabama,34 the Court stressed
the particular need for counsel in the period between the defen-
dant's arraignment and the beginning of trial "when consultation,
thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally impor-
tant. ' 35 Adversarial testing requires thorough exploration of de-
fenses as to both guilt and potential penalties and also investigation
into the prosecution's case. 36 In short, to provide effective assis-
tance of counsel consistent with the Sixth Amendment, defense
counsel has an independent duty to investigate the case.37
In 1984, the Supreme Court examined David Leroy Washing-
ton's claim that his attorney's failure to investigate and present
mitigating evidence at his capital sentencing hearing constituted in-
effective assistance of counsel.3" In its seminal decision in Strick-
land v. Washington, the Supreme Court explained for the first time
the test for ineffective assistance claims where defense counsel
"simply ... fail[ed] to render 'adequate legal assistance."' 39 The
34. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
35. Id. at 57 (reversing the convictions of the defendants due to a violation of their
right to counsel as a matter of due process). In Powell, the Supreme Court found a
constitutional right to appointed counsel, for the first time, under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 73. Eight years later, in Johnson v.
Zerbst, the Court ground the right to appointed counsel in the Sixth Amendment. 304
U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). It was not until 1963, with its decision in Gideon v. Wain-
wright, that the Court made this Sixth Amendment right applicable to the states. 372
U.S. 335, 339 (1963). A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at all
critical stages of a criminal case. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
36. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986) (stating that the adver-
sarial "testing process generally will not function properly unless defense counsel has
done some investigation into the prosecution's case and into various defense strate-
gies"); see also Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968) ("Counsel must
conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of
defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough time for reflection and prepa-
ration for trial").
37. Balkcom, 725 F.2d at 618. One judge, discussing defense counsel's duty to
investigate, emphasized that "[pireparation is the sine qua non of effective assis-
tance." Langone v. Smith, 682 F.2d 287, 289 (2d Cir. 1982) (Oakes, C.J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
38. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).
39. Id. at 686 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)). There are, in
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, two different types of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel: system ineffectiveness and attorney ineffectiveness. "In the former, the trial is
unfair because of systemic conditions operating apart from either the performance of
individual counsel or the facts of particular cases .... In the latter ... unfairness is a
product of attorney incompetence." Joe Margulies, Criminal Law: Resource Depriva-
tion & the Right to Counsel, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 673, 676 (1989-90). The
difference is significant because in claiming systemic ineffectiveness, the defendant
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Strickland Court established a two-prong test for actual ineffective-
ness under which a defendant must show that counsel's representa-
tion was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the
defendant's case.4 0 To prove deficiency, a defendant must show
that the attorney's "representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness" as measured by "prevailing professional
norms."41 To prove prejudice, a defendant must show "that the
decision reached would reasonably likely have been different ab-
sent the errors. 4 2 In other words, the requirement is that, without
counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability
that the factfinder would have reached a different result such as
acquittal, conviction on a lower charge, or imposition of a different
sentence.43
The claimed deficiency in Strickland was a failure to investi-
gate.4 4 The Court described the Sixth Amendment duty to investi-
gate as "a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unneces-
sary. '45 The key is strategic decision-making: an attorney can ei-
ther make a strategic choice after thorough investigation, or can
make a strategic choice that limited investigation is reasonable,
given the facts and circumstances of the particular case.46
need not show that he was prejudiced by the ineffectiveness; in addition, the relief for
systemic claims is prophylactic. The inability to investigate due to restrictive discov-
ery rules is systemic ineffectiveness. This article's suggestion of prophylactic relief in
the form of open file discovery is explored briefly in the Conclusion.
40. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Yarborough v. Gentry, 124 S. Ct. 1, 4
(2003) (noting that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel is denied when an attorney's performance falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness and thereby prejudices the defendant).
41. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
42. Id. at 696.; see also Scarpa v. DuBois, 38 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (acknowledg-
ing that "in itself, dreary lawyering does not offend the Constitution").
43. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. The Strickland Court found that a defendant's
burden is not so high as to show that the errors "more likely than not altered the
outcome in the case." Id at 693. Rather, the Court relied on the "reasonable
probability" language as more appropriate because finality concerns are somewhat
weaker when the claim is that the proceeding itself was unreliable. Id. at 694. If the
case ended in a guilty plea, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance must show that
trial counsel probably would have advised against the guilty plea absent the defi-
ciency, and that this probably would have led to acquittal at trial. See Hill v. Lockart,
474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (adopting two-part Strickland test for ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in guilty plea context).
44. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675.
45. Id. at 691.
46. Id. at 690-91. The Strickland Court noted that in undertaking an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim based on all the facts and circumstances of the case, a
court "should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing profes-
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Under Strickland, it is not failure to introduce certain mitigating
evidence that has constitutional significance; indeed, earlier Su-
preme Court cases found no Sixth Amendment violation where
counsel did not introduce any mitigating evidence at all.47 Rather,
it is counsel's failure to investigate enough to make an informed
decision about whether or not to introduce particular evidence that
violates the right to effective assistance of counsel: "Ultimately, the
courts are concerned that counsels' decisions reflect 'informed,
professional deliberation' rather than 'inexcusable ignorance or
senseless disregard of their clients' rights.' "48
Despite such clear recognition throughout the cases of the criti-
cal role that defense counsel's investigation plays in ensuring fair-
ness in the criminal justice system, and the square placement of
pretrial investigation among a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights, courts analyzing failure-to-investigate claims have not al-
ways treated them reverently. This treatment may stem from some
of the same concerns that led the Strickland Court to apply a pre-
sumption of strategic decision-making when analyzing post-convic-
tion claims of ineffective assistance-most notably the specter of a
proliferation of mini-trials on the issue of attorney performance.49
Defendants claiming ineffective assistance must overcome "a
strong presumption" that counsel's conduct was "sound trial strat-
egy."5 Under this standard, courts have often excused basic fail-
ures to investigate as reasonable, strategic decisions on the part of
defense counsel.' Strickland itself is an example: it was a capital
case in which defense counsel's entire mitigation investigation for
sional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case."
Id. at 690.
47. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 788-96 (1987) (characterizing defense coun-
sel's failure to put on any mitigating evidence at all in capital sentencing hearing as
strategic because counsel did some investigation into such potential evidence and con-
cluded that it would do more harm than good at the hearing); see also Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184-87 (1986) (same).
48. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1251 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd 466 U.S.
668 (1984) (quoting United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1122 (1st Cir. 1978)).
49. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
50. Id. at 698 (internal quotation omitted).
51. See, e.g., Knighton v. Maggio, 740 F.2d 1344, 1350 (5th Cir. 1984) (characteriz-
ing trial attorney's decision to do little investigation and offer no evidence at capital
sentencing phase as strategic); see also Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir.
2001) ("The Strickland standard is rigorous, and the great majority of habeas petitions
that allege constitutionally ineffective counsel founder on that standard"); Martin C.
Calhoun, Note & Comment, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based
Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413,
414 & n.11 (1988) (noting that the Supreme Court has rejected all four ineffectiveness
claims it decided in the four years after Strickland and that circuit courts have only
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the sentencing hearing-a hearing at which counsel presented no
evidence at all-consisted of conversations with his client and
phone contact with his client's wife and mother.52 The Court cate-
gorized this failure to investigate as "strategic" in denying the de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment claim; counsel's strategy was to focus
on defendant's remorse and acceptance of responsibility in a plea
for mercy to the exclusion of mitigation evidence at the sentencing
hearing.53
A number of courts have undertaken a more forceful analysis of
failure-to-investigate claims. For example, the Eight Circuit found
ineffective assistance when counsel investigated and presented an
alibi defense (albeit a weak one) at trial but failed to investigate
the possibility that someone else actually committed the crime.54
The court gave the duty to investigate real meaning: "Reasonable
performance of counsel includes an adequate investigation of the
facts of the case, consideration of viable theories, and development
of evidence to support those theories. Counsel has 'a duty ... to
investigate all witnesses who allegedly possessed knowledge con-
granted 4.3% of the 702 ineffectiveness claims they addressed in that same time
period).
52. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673.
53. Id. at 718. One standard does seem clear: the total failure to investigate would
violate the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir. 1989)
(noting that "the courts of appeals are in agreement that failure to conduct any pre-
trial investigation generally constitutes a clear instance of ineffectiveness"); see also
Knighton, 740 F.2d at 1351 (stating that, if defendant's claim of total failure to investi-
gate "were supported by the record, the sixth amendment standard would not have
been met"). The unfortunate reality is that many case are not investigated at all, due
to a number of factors which include plea bargaining that takes place very early in the
case, perhaps as early as the initial appearance (which may also be the first time the
defendant meets his lawyer) and inadequate investigatory resources that lead to
triage-like decisions about which cases to investigate. See John Mitchell, Redefining
the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215, 1274-80 (1994) (analogizing allocation
decisions that defenders in the lower criminal courts must make to medical triage
decisions). See generally Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense
of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581 (1987) (relaying
results of study finding poor quality of indigent defense in New York City). Broad
discovery, early in the process, can only alleviate such problems, either by easing
strained investigatory resources with investigatory leads that would otherwise need to
be tracked down, or by providing defense counsel with some information about the
case so there is less of an informational imbalance in the plea bargain process. See,
e.g., N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(a) (2003) (allowing pre-indictment discovery when prosecutor
makes a pre-indictment plea offer).
54. Hendersen v. Sargent, 926 F.2d 706, 711-12 (8th Cir. 1991) (reversing convic-
tion where counsel failed to investigate evidence that victim's husband, or possibly
another man with ties to the victim, had killed her because "[t]he decision to inter-
view a potential witness is not a decision related to trial strategy. Rather, it is a deci-
sion related to adequate preparation for trial" (internal quotations omitted)).
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cerning [the defendant's] guilt or innocence."' 55 While this rather
ambitious statement differs from the Supreme Court's articulation
of the duty to investigate,56 it does evidence great concern about
sanctioning attorney behavior that results in the termination, or
weakening, of viable defenses. It also mirrors the American Bar
Association ("ABA") and other professional standards for defense
counsel governing investigation.5 7
Most significantly, the Supreme Court's treatment of failure-to-
investigate claims has become substantially more exacting since
Strickland. In 2000, the Supreme Court reversed Terry Williams's
death sentence based on his attorney's failure to investigate miti-
gating evidence for his sentencing hearing.58 Williams v. Taylor
was the first Supreme Court decision to find ineffective assistance
of counsel under the two-prong Strickland standard, and it did so
based on a failure to undertake reasonable investigation. The
Court decided Williams during the 1999-2000 term, when "[a]lmost
one quarter of its cases involved either claims of ineffective assis-
tance or failures on the part of defense counsel that worked to the
detriment of their client's right."5 9 A summary of the Court's term
noted that "[o]ne trend emerging from this term's decisions is seen
in the Court's concern with ineffective assistance of counsel."6
This trend, together with the decision in Williams, "seemed to send
55. Id. at 711 (quoting Lawrence v. Armontrout, 900 F.2d 127, 130 (8th Cir.
1990)); Wade v. Armontrout, 798 F.2d 304, 307 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that defense
counsel's "failure to investigate was not the result of strategy or a reasonable decision
not to investigate, but rather [stemmed] from a lack of preparation").
56. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (describing duty to investigate as duty to "make
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular in-
vestigations unnecessary").
57. See COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS (Neal
Miller & Peter OhIhausen eds., 2000) (listing national, state, and local standards relat-
ing to five functions of indigent defense, including "Investigation and Preparation," in
a document prepared by the Institute for Law and Justice and supported by a contract
with the Department of Justice), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentde-
fense/compendi um/pdf.htm (last visited May 10, 2004). The American Bar Associa-
tion Standards for Criminal Justice state that "[d]efense counsel should conduct a
prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading
to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction."
Id. (emphasis added).
58. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (evidentiary omissions at trial
"clearly demonstrate that trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a
thorough investigation of the defendant's background" (citing 1 AM. BAR Ass'N,
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1, commentary, 4-55 (2d ed. 1980))).
59. Laurence Benner et al., Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: A Review of
United States Supreme Court Criminal and Habeas Corpus Decisions (Oct. 4, 1999-
Oct. 1, 2000), 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 239, 318 (2001).
60. Id.
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a clear signal that the Strickland standard can no longer be used to
whitewash such failures. ' 61 Then, only three years later, in Wiggins
v. Smith, the Court reversed a death sentence for ineffective assis-
tance of counsel-once again based on a failure to investigate.62
The facts of Wiggins are very similar to those in Strickland, de-
cided nineteen years earlier. To better understand what lies be-
neath the Court's renewed vigor in analyzing investigatory failures,
it is worth taking a closer, comparative look at the Wiggins and
Strickland cases before exploring the connection between investi-
gation and pretrial discovery.
B. From Strickland to Wiggins: Giving Meaning to the Duty
to Investigate
Both Wiggins and Strickland were capital cases involving Sixth
Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel due to de-
fense counsel's failure to investigate. Both failures related to the
lack of mitigation evidence at the sentencing hearing. Both deci-
sions were authored by Justice O'Connor and were decided 7-2.
The results, however, were strikingly dissimilar: Kevin Wiggins
awaits a new sentencing hearing63 while the State of Florida elec-
trocuted David Leroy Washington on July 13, 1984.64
1. Investigation and Mitigation Evidence in Strickland
and Wiggins
In Strickland, defense counsel conducted no investigation into
potential character witnesses for Washington and made no request
for a psychiatric exam, "since his conversations with his client gave
no indication that [his client] had psychological problems. '65 This
was despite the fact that Washington told the trial judge that at the
time of the crimes "he was under extreme stress caused by his in-
ability to support his family," and he had also described to the
61. Id. As one defense attorney noted, "[wihat is remarkable about Williams and
Wiggins is that neither of those cases are remarkable... [N]either Williams nor Wig-
gins involved a change in the standard governing [ineffective assistance] claims. In-
stead, it was the Supreme Court merely modeling the claims and the approach." John
Council, Litigate or Mitigate?: Supreme Court Opinion Puts a Wrinkle in Death-Pen-
alty Appeals, TEX. LAW., Jan. 26 2004, at 1 (quoting Jim Marcus, executive director of
the Texas Defender Service in Houston).
62. Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2544 (2003).
63. Id. at 2544.
64. See Death Penalty Information Center (2004), at http://www.deathpenalty
info.org (last visited May 18, 2004); see also Strickland v. Washington, 467 U.S. 1267
(1984) (denying petition for rehearing).
65. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
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judge his planning for, and participation in, "three groups of
crimes, which included three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kid-
naping, severe assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion,
and theft."' 66 Defense counsel's entire investigation consisted of
speaking with his client, and speaking by phone with Washington's
wife and mother; he made one unsuccessful attempt to meet these
two family members in person.
In Wiggins, the attorneys investigated three source of potential
mitigation evidence: 1) they had a psychologist conduct IQ and
psychological tests on Wiggins; 2) they had access to a Probation
and Parole Department pre-sentence report which included a one-
page, self-reported description of Wiggins's "misery as a youth"
and "disgusting" background; and 3) they "[t]racked down" Social
Services records documenting Wiggins's various foster care place-
ments.67 Although the Court did not mention it, Wiggins's attor-
neys presumably spoke with their client, just as defense counsel in
Strickland spoke with his-a consultation that the Strickland Court
noted as part of the "investigation" and which, indeed, constituted
most of the investigation.68 Wiggins's attorneys did not uncover
much of what the Supreme Court called a "bleak life history," one
that included reports of eating paint chips and garbage, being hos-
pitalized after his alcoholic mother held his hand on a stove burner,
being physically abused and raped in two foster homes, and living
intermittently on the streets from age sixteen.69 This history was
fully explored only after the trial in post-conviction proceedings.7 °
Not surprisingly, after so little investigation, neither defense
counsel put on much-if any-of a mitigation case. At Washing-
ton's sentencing hearing, defense counsel focused on arguing to the
judge that his client's "remorse and acceptance of responsibility
justified sparing him from the death penalty. '71 He also pointed
out his client's lack of criminal history and extreme mental distur-
bance at the time of the crimes but based both arguments only on
Washington's own testimony from the plea colloquy that took
place in front of the same judge.72 The Strickland Court noted two
reasons for counsel's decision "not to present and hence not to
look further for evidence concerning respondent's character and
66. Id. at 671-72.
67. Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2536.
68. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673.
69. Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2533.
70. Id. at 2532-33.
71. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673.
72. Id. at 672-74.
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emotional state. '73 First, counsel felt a "sense of hopelessness" af-
ter his client pled guilty and confessed, against his advice, to such
gruesome crimes.74 Second, he wanted to stick to the plea colloquy
so that the prosecution could not cross-examine Washington or put
on psychiatric evidence of its own. 75 The Court found that coun-
sel's decision to focus on acceptance of responsibility was driven by
his knowledge of the judge's reputation for placing value on re-
morse and such acceptance. Indeed, the trial judge told Washing-
ton that he had "a great deal of respect for people who are willing
to step forward and admit their responsibility. '76 He then sen-
tenced him to death.77
A similar scenario unfolded for Kevin Wiggins with respect to
mitigation evidence. Wiggins was found guilty in a bench trial but
had a jury for the sentencing phase of his capital murder trial.78 At
the sentencing hearing, Wiggins's two attorneys basically retried
the issue of guilt, offering evidence that Wiggins did not kill the
victim by his own hand and thus was not eligible for the death pen-
alty. They offered no evidence of Wiggins's life history despite
promising the jury that they would do so. 79 They did make a prof-
fer to the court about the mitigation case they would have put on
had the court granted their motion to bifurcate the sentencing
hearing into two phases, one to address death penalty eligibility
and the other to address mitigation. This would have included ex-
pert psychological testimony but not life history or family back-
ground.8 ° The jurors came back with a death sentence the same
day they were charged.81
Despite these strong parallels, the two cases are dissimilar in
their outcomes in the Supreme Court. In Strickland, the Court
found that counsel's decision "not to seek more character or psy-
chological evidence than was already in hand" was a reasonable
strategy that was "well within the range of professionally reasona-
ble judgment[ ].,182 As for prejudice, the Court rejected it outright.
73. Id. at 673.
74. Id. at 672.
75. Id. at 673.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 675.
78. Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2003).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699. Although ultimately discounting the effect of coun-
sel's state of mind, the majority mentioned his "sense of hopelessness" or how he "felt
hopeless" four times in the opinion. Id. at 672-73, 699. Justice Marshall, dissenting,
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It found that the evidence Washington claimed his attorney should
have offered could not have outweighed the overwhelming aggra-
vating factors supporting imposition of the death penalty. 83 In con-
trast, Wiggins held that defense counsel had not investigated
potential mitigation evidence sufficiently to make a reasoned, stra-
tegic decision that they would not introduce such evidence at the
hearing.84 With respect to the prejudice prong, since the mitigation
evidence presented during the post-conviction phase of the case
was "powerful, '85 the Court found that there was a reasonable
probability that the jury would have returned a non-death sentence
had they heard it.86
While counsel in both cases presented little-to-no mitigation evi-
dence, the Wiggins Court made clear that the issue was "not
whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case" but
rather "whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not
to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins's background was itself
reasonable."87 The Court measured reasonableness against "pre-
vailing professional standards," and found that counsel's investiga-
tion fell short.88
2. Changes in Prevailing Professional Norms Explain Differing
Outcomes in Strickland and Wiggins
It is this reliance on prevailing professional norms that explains
the difference between two such factually close cases.89 Norms
noted this "hopelessness" in deeming "[c]ounsel's failure to investigate . . . particu-
larly suspicious." Id. at 718. In fact, the majority implicitly conceded that defense
counsel's decision that he would not present-and thus did not need to look for-
evidence relating to Washington's character and emotional state was not entirely stra-
tegic by noting two reasons for defense counsel's decision: "trial counsel's sense of
hopelessness about overcoming the evidentiary effect of respondent's confessions to
the gruesome crimes[, and] ... the judgment that it was advisable to rely on the plea
colloquy for evidence about respondent's background and about his claim of emo-
tional stress." Id. at 673. Clearly, hopelessness about the case is not a strategic reason
for failing to investigate.
83. Id. at 699-700.
84. See Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2536.
85. Id. at 2542.
86. Id. at 2543.
87. Id. at 2536 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 2537 (distinguishing Strickland as a "precedent[ ] in which [the Court]
found limited investigations into mitigating evidence to be reasonable").
89. There are, certainly, some factual differences between the Strickland and Wig-
gins cases beyond the actual results. The Strickland sentencing hearing took place in
front of a judge, who defense counsel knew from practice to care deeply about accept-
ance of responsibility. This allowed the Court to put aside the attorney's hopelessness
and deem his meager investigation "strategic," since further investigation would have
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governing defense counsel investigation have evolved in the years
between the two decisions. These norms, in turn, are driven by the
ongoing debate over the death penalty which focuses on wrongful
convictions and their causes.
In Wiggins, Justice O'Connor repeated the Court's holding from
three years earlier in Williams v. Taylor, referencing professional
norms: failure to present mitigation evidence could not be strategic
where "counsel had not 'fulfill[ed] their obligation to conduct a
thorough investigation of the defendant's background"' before de-
ciding how to proceed at the sentencing hearing.90 The Wiggins
Court went on to find that Wiggins's attorneys' reliance on the
short pre-sentence investigation report and their client's Depart-
ment of Social Service records "fell short of the professional stan-
dards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989" requiring "preparation
of a social history report."9 1 Counsel also fell short of the ABA's
"well-defined norms," which call for investigation into "all reasona-
bly available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggra-
vating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor."'92
Characterizing counsel's failure to follow these norms as an "aban-
been-in his and the Court's view-pointless given the circumstances. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 699 (1984).
In contrast, Wiggins's attorneys' addressed to a jury which, as a group of strangers,
has no record of a collective, general predisposition toward favoring the defendant
accepting responsibility for his actions. One could certainly characterize counsel's de-
cision to argue lack of guilt on the capital charge-to the exclusion of mitigation-as
a strategic choice driven by the concern that mitigation would appear to the jury to be
an argument in the alternative that would weaken the primary argument. In Wiggins,
this would not be as strong a concern as in a case where counsel re-argues total lack of
guilt to the jury; this is because Wiggins's lawyers were conceding that he played some
role in the murder but that he was not directly responsible. See Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at
2532. Still, whether or not to argue in the alternative-or to argue something that a
jury might construe as alternative-is a strategic decision that defense counsel must
make in many cases. In fact, Wiggins's attorneys argued to the trial judge that failure
to bifurcate the sentencing hearing would result in dilution of their presentation about
Wiggins's lack of direct responsibility. Id.
In short, these differences are not so great as to explain the different outcomes;
rather, the evolution of professional norms and the backdrop of the death penalty
debate are critical to understanding the Court's much more exacting analysis of the
duty to investigate in Wiggins.
90. Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396
(2000)); see also supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing Williams). This
standard of thorough background investigation is drawn from the American Bar As-
sociation's STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 396 (refer-
encing 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1, commentary p. 4-55 (2d ed.
1980)).
91. Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2536.
92. Id. at 2537 (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PER-
FORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 11.4.1 (1989)).
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don[ment of] their investigation.., after having acquired only ru-
dimentary knowledge of [Wiggins'] history from a narrow set of
sources," the Court found that the failure to investigate stemmed
from "inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment."93 Profes-
sional standards are integral to the Sixth Amendment analysis in
Wiggins; the constitutional right is explicitly attached to, and de-
pends upon, the current state of the professional norm.94
In contrast to Wiggins, the Strickland decision never specified
any of the prevailing norms governing investigation generally or
investigation into mitigation at a capital sentencing hearing; it
merely cited, almost in passing, the entire portion of the ABA's
Standards for Criminal Justice on "The Defense Function."95 In-
deed, the Court noted that the definition of the duty to investigate
requires "no special amplification" beyond an assessment of "rea-
sonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of
deference to counsel's judgments. 96 The level of specificity of,
and reliance upon, the professional standards gives Wiggins much
more force than Strickland with respect to the constitutional duty
to investigate. 97
93. Id.
94. This reliance on prevailing norms to set the constitutional floor is not unique
to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (not-
ing that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"); see also Lawrence v. Texas,
123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003) (noting, in overruling its earlier decision in Bowers, that
"our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here. These
references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to
sex"); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) ("A claim that punishment is exces-
sive is judged not by the standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided
over the "Bloody Assizes" or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by
those that currently prevail").
95. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) ("Prevailing norms of prac-
tice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like, e.g., ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) ("The Defense Function"),
are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides").
96. Id. at 690-91.
97. See, e.g., Leading Cases, supra note 19, 278-79 (2003) ("In Wiggins, the Court
promoted a longstanding guideline of the ABA-that capital counsel thoroughly ex-
plore the social background of the defendant-to the level of constitutional man-
date"). Id. at 282. The capital defense bar's reaction to Wiggins has been swift. In
April, 2004, the Habeas Assistance & Training Counsel and Federal Death Penalty
Resource Counsel Projects sponsored "Wiggins Mitigation Training" to focus on the
implications of the decision. See Death Penalty and Capital Habeas Corpus 2004
Training for Defense Counsel and Mitigation Specialists, at http://www.capdefnet.org/
fd prc/contents/shared-files/upcom ing.seminars/upcoming.htm (last visited May 12,
2004) (announcing training and noting that "the [Wiggins] court found that the failure
to seek the services of a mitigation specialist or social history investigator to conduct a
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3. Recent Death Penalty Debates and the Evolution of
Investigation Standards
Recent debates over fairness in the death penalty, and in particu-
lar the current dialogue about wrongful conviction and its causes,
drive the evolution of norms surrounding the duty to investigate.
These debates lie just beneath the surface of the Court's greater
scrutiny of the failure to investigate in Williams and Wiggins. A
significant number of highly-publicized cases of wrongful convic-
tion of innocent men and women-some of whom came close to
execution only to be exonerated by DNA or other evidence-has
led to continued inquiry into ways to protect against wrongful con-
viction. Full investigation of the case in which the trial lawyer's
original investigation was inadequate is one way to exonerate inno-
cent defendants. 98 The commentary accompanying the recently-
published Revised ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Per-
formance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases lists "inade-
quate investigation by defense attorneys," along with such things as
"faulty eyewitness identification, coerced confessions, prosecu-
comprehensive investigation into the entire life of the client fell below existing profes-
sional norms, constituted an unreasonable, incomplete investigation").
98. See, e.g., Dan Malone, When the System Fails; Cuban Immigrant Freed 14 Years
After Death Sentence, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 23, 1997 at 1A (describing the
case of Roberto Miranda who was freed from prison only after an appellate attorney
investigated the case and located evidence that led the prosecutor to dismiss the
charges); see also Innocence Project, Poor Defense Lawyering, at http://
www.innocenceproject.org/c auses/badlawyering.php (2001) (noting that "[flailure to
investigate, failure to call witnesses, inability to prepare for trial (due to caseload or
incompetence), are a few examples of poor lawyering").
There have been calls for a number of other major systemic reforms including:
1) More reliable identification procedures, see NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A TRAINER'S MANUAL FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT V (2003), available at http://nij.ncjrs.org/publications/
pubs-db.asp; see also OFFICE OF THE ArrORNEY GEN., N.J. DEP'T OF LAW
& PUB. SAFETY, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND
CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LIVE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
(2001), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf;
2) Videotaping of suspects' statements, see Steve Mills & Michael Higgins,
Cops Urged To Tape Their Interrogations; City Videotapes Only Confessions,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6, 2002, at 1; see also Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo,
Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891,
997 (2004) (noting that a "videotape will capture any police abuses and/or
improprieties as well as protect detectives from false accusations");
3) Better funding for counsel in capital cases, see Bruce Moyer, DNA Legis-
lation Scores Wide Support, FED. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 10 (discussing the
Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology Act of 2003 (H.R. 3214), ap-
proved by the House Judiciary Committee in October 2003, which includes a
provision for increased funding for counsel in capital cases).
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torial misconduct, and false jailhouse informant testimony" as con-
tributing factors to wrongful convictions in capital and non-capital
cases.99 These factors are not unrelated; thorough investigation
into the prosecution's case, for example, can expose weaknesses in
an eyewitness' identification, the factor often noted as the primary
cause of wrongful convictions. 100
Wrongful conviction cases have contributed greatly to the sea
changes in public and professional opinion about administration of
the death penalty in the nineteen-year interim since Strickland.101
99. AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORM-
ANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES Guideline 10.7 commentary (2003)
[hereinafter 2003 ABA GUIDELINES FOR COUNSEL] (providing commentary accom-
panying guideline on investigation) (emphasis added); see also Gary Goodpaster, Ad-
versary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59, 90-91 (1986) (listing "Failure to conduct an ade-
quate pretrial investigation" as one of the "major generic deficiencies of criminal de-
fense attorneys," based on review of ineffective assistance cases); Barbara R. Levine,
Preventing Defense Counsel Error-An Analysis of Some Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims and Their Implications for Professional Regulation, 15 U. TOL. L.
REV. 1275, 1371 (1984) (finding, in a statistical analysis of a sample of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in Michigan, that the most frequent ineffective assistance
claim is the failure to investigate or introduce defense evidence). A new subsection to
the ABA's death penalty investigation guideline, added in the 2003 update, states that
"[c]ounsel at every stage have an obligation to conduct a full examination of the de-
fense provided to the client at all prior phases of the case." 2003 ABA GUIDELINES
FOR COUNSEL Guideline 10.7.B.1. This seems designed to emphasize the need to
remedy inadequate investigation at the trial level; see also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, 101 ALMOST DEAD MEN WALK (listing ineffective assistance as one of the
systemic errors that sends innocent people to death row and noting that defense coun-
sel may miss key pieces of potentially exonerating information due to failure to inves-
tigate), available at http://archive.aclu.org/features/Long MoratoriumFactSheet.pdf.
100. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, Official Says DNA & Alibis Clear Suspect in
Sex Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at B1 (quoting Peter Neufeld, co-founder of
the Innocence Project, as stating that "[t]he single greatest cause of wrongful convic-
tions is lineup misidentifications caused by unreliable police lineup procedures").
101. For example, on January 31, 2000, Illinois Governor George Ryan declared a
moratorium on all executions, noting that in the period since 1977, Illinois had exe-
cuted twelve inmates and released thirteen from death row. He then appointed a
commission to study issues of fairness in administration of the death penalty, focusing
on the causes of wrongful conviction. Timeline: Illinois Governor's Commission on
Capital Punishment, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/timeline/pdf (last visited May
18, 2004). Peter Neufeld and Barry Scheck at the Innocence Project have done
groundbreaking work in the area of wrongful conviction, see Innocence Project, at
www.innocenceproject.org. (last visited May 18, 2004), as have Northwestern's Medill
Journalism School Professor David Protess and his students, using "the techniques of
investigative journalism, [to] expose[ ] tragic miscarriages of justice in a number of
high-profile cases in Illinois." Bob Herbert, Returned to Life, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
2003, at A39 (describing the great impact that Professor Protess' and his students'
work has had).
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At the time of Washington's trial in 1976,102 the ABA did not have
national guidelines with respect to capital case representation.
10 3
The organization adopted guidelines in 1989 (the year the Wiggins
case was tried) and called for "independent investigations relating
to the guilt/innocence phase and to the penalty phase" that counsel
must undertake "regardless of any admission or statement by the
client concerning facts constituting guilt.' 10 4 In 2003, the ABA re-
placed these guidelines with even more exacting ones that demand
that "counsel at every stage have an obligation to conduct thorough
and independent investigation. '" 105 The ABA commentary to the
guideline on investigation states explicitly that it is the developing
understanding about the causes of wrongful convictions that has
driven the evolving standards. Such concerns "underscore[ ] the
importance of defense counsel's duty to take seriously the possibil-
ity of the client's innocence, to scrutinize carefully the quality of
the state's case, and to investigate and re-investigate all possible
defenses."106
While the death penalty stands apart from all other penalties,0 7
the concerns that fuel the debate over fairness in the death penalty
are certainly not limited to the capital context. The constitutional
principles relating to the duty to investigate apply equally to the
102. See Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 883 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd 466 U.S.
668 (1984).
103. See AM. BAR Ass'N, ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PER-
FORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES i (1989) ("While some
local standards may exist for capital representation, national guidelines on the assign-
ment and performance of counsel in capital cases did not exist prior to these
Guidelines").
104. Id. at Guideline 11.4.1.
105. 2003 ABA GUIDELINES FOR COUNSEL, supra note 99, at Guideline 10.7 (em-
phasis added). Guideline 11.4.1 from the 1989 version became Guideline 10.7 in the
2003 version. The 2003 version of the guideline added two new subsections address-
ing the lawyer's obligation to examine the defense that was provided to the client in
previous phases of the case and the lawyer's duty to ensure that the official record is
complete. Id.
106. Id. at Guideline 10.7 commentary.
107. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart,
Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (recognizing "that the penalty of death is different in kind from
any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice"); see also Gard-
ner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358 (1977) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
From the point of view of the defendant, [the death penalty] is different in
both its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action
of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramati-
cally from any other legitimate state action. It is of vital importance to the
defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sen-
tence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.
Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357-358 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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guilt/innocence and sentencing phases of all trials, whether they are
capital or non-capital cases. The Strickland Court reasoned that
the duty to investigate mitigation evidence in a capital case is given
such scrutiny because capital sentencing hearings are more like
"ordinary trials" than sentencing hearings. Sentencing hearings in
death penalty cases, like all trials, call for the effective assistance of
counsel to ensure testing in an adversarial process. 108 Thus, the
duty to investigate applies to both factual and mitigation investiga-
tion. In addition, wrongful convictions based on inadequate inves-
tigation at the trial level occur in non-capital as well as capital
cases, with consequences ranging from long prison sentences to se-
rious collateral penalties, such as mandatory deportation of a law-
ful permanent resident based on one relatively minor conviction. 10 9
As one commentator has noted, "[b]ecause most exonerations
have not resulted in written legal opinions, their impact is only
slowly seeping into case law." 110 The death penalty debate is surely
in the undercurrents of the Court's treatment of defense counsel's
duty to investigate potential mitigation evidence. The Wiggins
Court's decision to grant relief is so significant because Wiggins's
attorneys actually did far more investigation than the attorney did
in Strickland. This signals a clear move towards greater scrutiny of
failures to investigate, driven by evolving standards for investiga-
tion that are responsive to the role that adequate investigation is
given in the death penalty debate.
If adequate investigations help ensure against wrongful convic-
tion-which is, after all, the central purpose of our criminal justice
system, along with the related goal of conviction of the guilty-
then how does one best protect against inadequate investigation?
The next section explores the role pretrial discovery plays in the
108. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984). The reasoning be-
hind both Strickland and Wiggins is that one cannot decide which mitigation evidence
to put on unless one investigates mitigation in the first instance. This applies with
equal force to fact investigation. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's articulation of the duty
to investigate in Strickland does not even mention the word "mitigation":
[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts rele-
vant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices
made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the
extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on in-
vestigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investi-
gations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary.
Id. at 690-91.
109. See, e.g., Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000).
110. Adele Bernhard, Exonerations Change Judicial Views on Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2003, at 37.
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fulfillment of such goals. It discusses the link between the duty to
investigate and discovery, and concludes that the Constitution does
not allow the state to create inadequate investigation by rule.
II. THE LINK BETWEEN THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
AND DISCOVERY
A right to effective assistance of counsel that truly recognizes the
duty to investigate rings hollow without access to discovery. There
are of course enormous systemic and practical obstacles to attain-
ing the goal of appropriate investigation in every case, with lack of
funding and high caseloads chief amongst them.' Yet broad early
111. These obstacles are the source of a well-developed body of scholarship. See,
e.g., Richard Klein, Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Con-
stitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625,
656-57 (1986) (citing, in a section devoted to the "Underfunding of Defender Offices
and the Resulting Inadequate Representation by Counsel," a study finding that
"[r]elatively few indigent defendants have the benefit of investigation and other ex-
pert assistance in their defense. Their advocates are overburdened, undertrained, and
underpaid"); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Ser-
vices and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BuFF. L. REV. 329, 397-410 (1995) (discussing
lack of meaningful assistance of counsel in capital litigation); Rebecca Marcus, Note,
Racism in Our Courts: The Underfunding of Public Defenders and Its Disproportion-
ate Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 219, 219 (1994) (noting
how "[y]ears of consistently severe underfunding, increased caseloads and inadequate
resources have created a serious crisis in this nation's public defender system"); Note,
Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113
HARv. L. REV. 2062 (2000); see also Wayne J. Lee, Indigent Defense-A Failed Prom-
ise, LA. BAR J., Oct.-Nov. 2003, at 174-75 [hereinafter Lee, Indigent Defense] (noting
that in random sampling of 172 files from one Louisiana Public Defender's Office,
only two contained investigative memos).
Defense counsel who are overwhelmed with cases and lack funds to hire investiga-
tors may not benefit from broad, early discovery in the way that private counsel or a
relatively well-funded defender office might. Still, even in resource-poor situations,
such discovery will make an enormous difference to the ability to make more in-
formed decisions about plea offers because counsel will be able to consider the prose-
cution's likely case. See, e.g., Laura Berend, Less Reliable Preliminary Hearings &
Plea Bargains in Criminal Cases in California: Discovery Before and After Proposition
115, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 465, 523-24 (1998). In an insightful article, Professor Berend
focuses on a specific California proposition which has "dramatically alter[ed] the dis-
covery process in criminal cases," id. at 467, but explores important issues that apply
to discovery nationally. She notes that "[c]ourts rely on the effective assistance of
counsel to ensure that guilty pleas are constitutionally acceptable, whether or not dis-
covery supporting a prosecutor's burden of proof has been provided to the defense.
Without access to discovery, however, that assistance has little meaning." Id. at 523-
24.
While in no way underestimating the significance of these other institutional obsta-
cles to the delivery of effective assistance of counsel, this article focuses on the role of
discovery in the investigatory process because this link to the Sixth Amendment right
has not been well-explored in the literature or the case law and because discovery is
such a critical component in the ability to investigate.
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discovery offers great potential for the advancement of better de-
fense investigation with few, if any, downsides." 2 Moreover, fail-
ure to extend such discovery is a governmentally-imposed obstacle
to investigation in situations where the accused simply does not
have the necessary information or is unable to share it with the
attorney due, for example, to mental illness.
1 1 3
There are five sources of authority for pretrial discovery: 1) stat-
utes;" 4 2) court rules; 115 3) the judiciary's "inherent power to grant
discovery when necessary to achieve justice"; 1 6 4) the common
law;" 7 and 5) the Constitution.'18 In almost all jurisdictions, court
rule or statute governs discovery in criminal cases. These rules set
out the procedure, including the timing, of the discovery process
and determine which items are subject to discovery." 9 The differ-
ent states, and the federal system, vary widely in their approaches
to discovery rules. At one end of the spectrum are jurisdictions
that follow the highly restrictive federal discovery rules; these juris-
dictions number around twelve.1 20 New York is one such jurisdic-
tion. At the other end are the slightly larger number of
jurisdictions following the broad 1970 American Bar Association
Standards. 21 Around half of the states fall in the middle of the
spectrum.
122
The differences between the Federal and ABA models can be
seen in their treatment of discovery of witness lists, information
112. See infra Part III, on why arguments against broad, early discovery lack
validity.
113. See supra note 24 and accompanying text, describing other reasons why a de-
fendant might be unwilling or unable to share information with his lawyer.
114. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW Art. 240 (McKinney 2002).
115. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
116. Traynor, supra note 5, at 231 (citing Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343,
345 (1959) (dictum)). This article does not examine the court's inherent supervisory
power to order discovery as such power is "all too rarely exercised." Id. In addition,
courts exercise supervisory power only in specific cases and under specific circum-
stances. Thus, while it is certainly an important power that should be used more than
it is to correct particular problems, it does not offer a consistent model for pretrial
discovery.
117. See LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 20.2(a), at 915 ("Today, common law jurisdictions
have all but disappeared").
118. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also infra Part II.B,
noting the constitutional sources for access to information.
119. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 20.2(b), at 915-16.
120. Id. at 916.
121. Id.; see STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that
"[tihis report proposes more permissive discovery practices for criminal cases than is
provided by applicable law in any jurisdiction in the United States").
122. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 20.2(b), at 916.
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that is critical to defense counsel's ability to investigate. States that
follow the ABA model generally require that the prosecution dis-
close to the defense both names and addresses of witnesses that the
state intends to call. 2 3 Thus, a number of "sizeable states with one
or more large urban centers-e.g., California, Florida, Illinois,
Michigan, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania-have broader criminal
discovery rules than New York, particularly with regard to disclo-
sure of prosecution witness lists. ' 12 4 Florida even allows defense
counsel to depose certain prosecution witnesses.125 In contrast, the
current federal rules do not allow for discovery of witness names
and the restrictive discovery states follow this model.126 There are
thus a significant minority of jurisdictions in which restrictive dis-
123. Id. § 20.3(h), at 925; see also 1990 Brennan, supra note 5, at 10-11.
Fourteen states, for example, allow the defendant access to prosecution wit-
ness statements as of right prior to trial, and another eight permit such ac-
cess at the court's discretion-rules considerably more liberal than the
[federal discovery rules]. Others require pretrial disclosure by the prosecu-
tion of relevant recorded statement not just of its witnesses, but of any per-
son. Many states require the prosecution to disclose in advance a list of
persons it intends to call as witnesses. And a few states permit discovery
depositions, either as of right or upon a showing of need.
1990 Brennan, supra note 5, at 10-11.
124. LAWRENCE K. MARKS ET AL, NEW YORK PRETRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
407 (1996) (citing "Criminal Discovery in New York," A Report to the New York
State Assembly Codes Committee (1992)). As early as 1976, fifteen states failed to
require discovery of prosecution witnesses; of the ten most populous states, only New
York and Massachusetts were among the fifteen. Pretrial Discovery in Criminal
Cases: A Study (Report of the City Bar Committee) [Part 1], N.Y. L.J., Jul. 6, 1976, at
1 [hereinafter Pretrial Discovery f]. At that same time, Alaska, Florida, New Jersey,
and Vermont required the prosecution to turn over names of all people with relevant
information about the case, including people the prosecution did not plan to call at
trial. Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Study (Report of the City Bar Commit-
tee) [Part 2], N.Y. L.J., Jul. 7, 1976, at 1 (citing ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(i);
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a)(1)(i); N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3(9)(7); VT. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)).
125. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. §3.220(h) (2003).
126. In 1975, Congress rejected an amendment to the federal rules that would have
mandated witness list disclosure. See 48 F.R.D. 547, 589-90 (1970) (proposing, in
preliminary draft of amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that
"[u]pon motion of the defendant the court may order the attorney for the government
to furnish to the defendant a written list of the names and addresses of all government
witnesses which the attorney for the government intends to call at the trial," absent
certification from the government "that to do so may subject the witness or others to
physical or substantial economic harm or coercion"); Clennon, supra note 16, at 653
(describing Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules' failed attempt to grant right to
pretrial discovery of the names and addresses of government witnesses, an amend-
ment that would have "represented perhaps the most significant expansion of federal
criminal discovery in a generation").
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
covery is the rule, and has remained the rule, despite decades of
successful experience with broad discovery in other jurisdictions. 27
Part A of this section examines the discovery process in New
York State both generally and through the practical example of the
Jane Smith case which was briefly described in the Introduction.
This close examination of the late and paltry amount of discovery
in New York serves to illustrate the clash between the Sixth
Amendment duty to investigate and restrictive discovery rules.
Part B of this section will take a brief look at the existing constitu-
tional bases for access to information, which are basically limited to
a defendant's right to material, exculpatory evidence in the posses-
sion of the prosecution.
A. Too Little, Too Late: A Case Study of New York's
Restrictive Discovery Statute
In New York State, discovery is governed largely by Article 240
of the Criminal Procedure Law. 128 In order to appreciate the cen-
tral role this discovery statute plays in defense counsel's access to
information, it is crucial to recognize the lack of opportunities for
such access outside of the statute in New York. To take two exam-
ples, preliminary hearings and voluntary disclosure by the prosecu-
tor are often cited as, and can in certain circumstances constitute,
important alternative sources for access to information.
Preliminary hearings can provide "a fairly detailed look at much
of the state's case. ' 12 9 New York prosecutors, however, generally
127. See Clennon, supra note 16, at 655-62 (discussing "Expansion of Criminal Dis-
covery at the State Level: The Trend Toward Disclosure of Witness Lists" and noting
how twenty-eight states grant defendants pretrial disclosure of names of witnesses the
prosecutor expects to call at trial).
128. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW Art. 240 (McKinney 2002).
129. Rodney J. Uphoff, Criminal Discovery in Oklahoma: A Call for Legislative
Action, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 381, 382-3 (1993) (describing discovery in Oklahoma); see
also Steve Schulhofer, Effective Assistance On The Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 137, 146 (1986) ("In felony cases, Philadelphia defenders prepare
very thoroughly. They rely on a client interview and the transcript of the preliminary
hearing to determine what investigation is required ...."). But see LAFAVE, supra
note 8, § 14.1(h), at 705 (noting that the extent of discovery through preliminary hear-
ing depends on several factors, including whether hearsay is allowed, the standard of
evidence required for bindover, the general practice with respect to how much evi-
dence is offered, limits on the defendant's ability to cross-examine witnesses, what
discovery is available for the hearing, and whether the defendant makes the tactical
decision to use his subpoena and cross-examination rights for discovery). "In many
jurisdictions, these factors combine to provide preliminary hearing discovery that is of
quite limited use." Id.
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avoid preliminary hearings, 130 and instead use the grand jury pro-
cess. This is a secret proceeding closed to the defendant and de-
fense counsel except for a defendant's opportunity to offer a
statement, should he so choose, which would then subject the de-
fendant to cross examination.13 1 In the majority of New York
cases, informal opportunities for discovery at the preliminary hear-
ing stage simply do not exist.132
Another potential source of access to information is the prosecu-
tor's voluntary disclosure of information beyond, or perhaps ear-
lier, than required by statute. While it is true that a fair number of
prosecutors voluntary disclose information in a variety of jurisdic-
tions and circumstances, this is unpredictable and certainly not
evenly applied. For example, Manhattan prosecutors follow the re-
strictive statute rather closely, while across the East River in
Brooklyn, prosecutors voluntarily offer open file discovery. 33
Even if there is access to information through pretrial proceed-
ings or voluntary disclosure, these sources cannot replace the dis-
covery statute in consistently providing the necessary tools to fulfill
130. See NEW YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE 86 (Lawrence N. Gray et al. eds., 2d ed.
1998) [hereinafter GRAy, CRIMINAL PRACTICE] (noting that prosecutors try to avoid
preliminary hearings as a general matter).
131. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. Art. 190 (Mckinney 2004) ("The Grand Jury and its
Proceedings"). In New York, the prosecutor must secure an indictment from a grand
jury, even if a preliminary hearing precedes it. See People v. lannone, 384 N.E.2d 656,
660 n.3 (N.Y. 1978) ("The right to indictment by a Grand Jury in New York is depen-
dent solely upon our State Constitution, since the Grand Jury provision contained in
the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution is not applicable to the States" (cit-
ing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884))). The only exception to the New York
State grand jury indictment requirement is if the defendant waives indictment and
consents to be prosecuted by written accusation of the district attorney. See N.Y.
CONST. art. I, § 6; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 195.10 (Mckinney 2004) (waiver
of indictment). Once the grand jury indicts, a defendant has no right to a preliminary
hearing since the purpose of both is to determine that there is reasonable cause to
hold and prosecute a defendant. Vega v. Bell, 393 N.E.2d 450, 454 (N.Y. 1979)
("Once the Grand Jury does act, the determination whether there exist [sic] reasona-
ble cause to hold and prosecute a defendant has been made by the Grand Jury itself,
the body constitutionally authorized to make that decision.., and hence the need for
a [preliminary] felony hearing is obviated" (citing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6)). Thus,
prosecutors go directly to the grand jury and rarely use the preliminary hearing pro-
cess in New York.
132. Even if a defendant were to have a preliminary hearing, there is no right at
this stage to any discovery, as the statutory right to discovery attaches only after in-
dictment. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20 (Mckinney 2004). See discussion infra in
text accompanying notes 140-45.
133. Copy of Brooklyn District Attorney's office standard open file discovery
agreement is on file with author. While the "open file" policy in Brooklyn does not
always lead to a true disclosure of all agreed-upon information, the discovery is cer-
tainly broader and earlier than discovery in Manhattan.
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the duty to investigate. While preliminary hearings-when they
happen-often allow defense counsel some access to information,
the information is neither assured nor full. As one New York prac-
tice guide notes, in the rare instance that a prosecutor conducts a
preliminary hearing, he "will attempt to keep'the testimony to an
absolute minimum, making out only a 'bare bones' case sufficient
to convince the hearing judge to hold the case for grand jury ac-
tion."'134 With voluntary disclosure, defense counsel may feel con-
strained from making full and effective use of the disclosed
materials, "lest he be cut off from discovery in future cases. "135
Thus, "[p]retrial discovery can operate effectively only if it is im-
partially administered in accord with objective standards free of
adversary considerations of trial strategy. 1 36
In short, the ability to investigate is, in large part in certain cases,
dependent upon the discovery statute.137 In New York and in other
134. GRAY, CRIMINAL PRACTICE, supra note 130, at 86. Pretrial proceedings were
not designed as discovery devices and the fact that they are not intended for use in
obtaining discovery is often written into the statute or rule. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 866(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 2004) (noting a preliminary hearing "shall not be
used for purposes of discovery").
135. Traynor, supra note 5, at 237 (citation omitted) (noting that "if a prosecutor
bars discovery except when his evidence is so strong that discovery might induce the
defendant to plead guilty, he may seriously discriminate against the defendant who is
barred from discovering the weakness of the evidence against him"). In noting these
drawbacks to voluntary disclosure, it is not the intention of this article to underesti-
mate the importance of such disclosure. Prosecutors, who are charged with respecting
and enforcing constitutional rules, may recognize the Sixth Amendment problems
that restrictive discovery rules cause. By releasing more information than required by
statute, or releasing it earlier than required, a prosecutor may make it possible for
defense counsel to fulfill the duty to investigate. The critique here is based on the fact
that not all prosecutors offer voluntary disclosure, and thus there is no uniform rule.
136. Id. at 237-38.
137. While New York State judges do have some inherent authority to order dis-
covery, it is limited both by statute and in practice. New York's Criminal Procedure
Law gives the trial court discretion to order discovery of certain property not covered
under the main scheme, as long as it is "material to the preparation of [the] defense."
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40(1)(c) (Mckinney 2004). Such discretionary orders,
however, are limited to property "which the people intend to introduce at the trial."
Id. In addition, the discovery is reciprocal: if ordered for the defendant, the judge
must upon request also order for the prosecution discovery from the defendant of any
property "of the same kind or character." Id. This may account for the very limited
use, in practice, of this subsection of the discovery statute. Judges may also read their
discretion quite restrictively. For example, in offering an example of what the statute
might mean by "material to the defense," the Practice Commentaries to § 240.40 lists
evidence "such as is deemed within defendant's constitutional right of access to evi-
dence." Although constitutionally-mandated evidence is offered only as an example,
such a restrictive reading of the term "material" would render discretionary grants
duplicative of a defendant's clearly-established constitutional right to exculpatory evi-
dence. See infra text accompanying notes 199-203 (discussing Brady v. Maryland). It
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jurisdictions where access to information is similarly restricted, the
right to effective assistance of counsel is closely linked to the dis-
covery statute and it is critical to scrutinize that statute in light of
the Sixth Amendment.
Shortly after the passage of the latest major amendments to Ar-
ticle 240 in 1979, the New York Court of Appeals painted a rather
rosy picture of the potentials of the new law, stating that it:
[Elvinces a legislative determination that the trial of a criminal
charge should not be a sporting event where each side remains
ignorant of facts in the hands of the adversary until events un-
fold at trial. Broader pretrial discovery enables the defendant to
make a more informed plea decision, minimizes the tactical and
often unfair advantage to one side, and increases to some degree
the opportunity for an accurate determination of guilt or inno-
cence .... In short, pretrial discovery by the defense and prose-
cution contributes substantially to the fair and effective
administration of justice. 38
Unfortunately, under New York's discovery statute, the defense re-
mains quite ignorant of the prosecution's case until events unfold
at trial.139
would also be duplicative of other sections of Article 240. See § 240.20(h) (stating
that the prosecutor must disclose anything required "pursuant to the constitution of
this state or of the United States"); § 240.40(a) (court must order discovery of any
material not disclosed under § 240.20, upon a finding that refusal to comply with
§ 240.20 is not justified).
In addition to this limited supervisory power, there are also a number of New York
State common law rules governing discovery. Many of these, however, have been
codified. See, e.g., People v. Rosario, 173 N.E.2d 881, 884 (N.Y. 1961) (codified in
§ 240.45). In short, it is the statute itself, Article 240, which is the central source
governing discovery in New York.
138. People v. Copicotto, 406 N.E.2d 465, 226 (N.Y. 1980) (citation omitted). In
New York, the defendant also has a right to demand a Bill of Particulars to learn
factual information that is not included in the indictment. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 200.95 (1)(a) (Mckinney 2004). This does not, however, include "matters of evi-
dence relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the offense charged
or how the people intend to prove any item of factual information included in the bill
of particulars." Id. In this author's practice experience, demands for bills of particu-
lars rarely, if ever, garnered information beyond that contained in the complaint and
indictment. For this reason, and because the bill of particulars is not truly a discovery
device but rather serves to give the defendant further notice of the charges, see id.,
this article focuses on Article 240 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law.
139. The New York statute is based on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16,
which is considered to be one of the most restrictive discovery rules in the country.
Two major differences between the federal and New York State discovery rules are,
first, under federal law, the defense can get a trial witness's prior statement only after
she has testified and only upon demand. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(A) (2000). Under the New
York statute, these statements are available after jury selection and before the prose-
cution's opening statement. N.Y.CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45(1). Second, the federal
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Under Article 240 the right to discovery attaches only after the
filing of an indictment in felonies or an "information" (the docu-
ment upon which a misdemeanor prosecution can proceed) in mis-
demeanors. 140 Thus, there is no right to discovery between arrest
and the filing of the indictment or information. With misdemean-
ors, this can mean a period of up to ninety days after the defendant
first appears in court with no possibility of discovery. 141 For felo-
nies, this period can stretch to six months.142
The period after arrest, particularly when the arrest is made
shortly after the incident at issue, is critical to the investigatory
process. As Justice Brennan said:
What assigned counsel obviously needs to discharge the heavy
responsibility we give him is at least the opportunity to do what
the state does when the trail is fresh, namely, seeking corrobora-
tion of the accused's story, or lack of it, from external facts
rule limits such discovery to prior statements reduced to writing that are signed, ap-
proved or adopted by the witness. FED. R. GRIM. P. 26.2 (f)(1). In New York, such
adoption is not required, so that an investigator's notes of a conversation with the
witness are discoverable. See People v. Consolazio, 354 N.E.2d 801, 804-05 (N.Y.
1976).
140. § 240.20(1); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 100.10 (Mckinney 2004) (defin-
ing "information" and other local criminal court accusatory instruments); Hynes v.
Cirigliano, 579 N.Y.S.2d 171, 171-72 (App. Div. 1992) (trial court exceeded its author-
ity in ordering discovery where felony complaint was filed but indictment had yet to
be filed, since statute only allows for discovery after indictment). The Second Depart-
ment has found that this rule applies even in a capital case. See Brown v. Appelman,
672 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375 (App. Div. 1998) (denying pre-indictment request for discov-
ery). Indeed, one lower court applied the rule to exculpatory evidence, holding that a
defendant who was arrested but not yet indicted for a homicide had no statutory or
constitutional right to obtain a videotape of the crime, one that allegedly showed two
other men committing the crime. People v. Anthony Gervais, 756 N.Y.S.2d 390, 396-
97 (Grim. Ct. 2003).
141. This is because the prosecution has ninety days under New York's speedy trial
statute to convert the accusatory instrument used at the initial arraignment into the
"information" necessary to proceed to trial on a misdemeanor. N.Y. GRIM. PROC.
LAW § 30.30(1)(b) (Mckinney 2004) (setting out speedy trial period for misdemeanors
that are punishable by more than three months in jail). In the case of misdemeanors
that are punishable by no more than three months in jail, the speedy trial period is
sixty days. § 30.30(1)(c).
142. § 30.30(1)(a) (setting out speedy trial period for felonies). In practice, felonies
are often indicted shortly after the initial court appearance because a court must re-
lease an incarcerated defendant who is not indicted within five or six days on his own
recognizance. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 180.80 (Mckinney 2004) (release of defendant from
custody upon failure of timely disposition). This shorter time period may also happen
with incarcerated defendants on misdemeanors, where the prosecutor has five days in
which to file an "information" to avoid release of the defendant from custody. N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.70 (Mckinney 2004). Still, as discussed infra in text accompa-
nying notes 154-165, a defendant can receive only very limited discovery in the period
between the filing of the indictment or information and pretrial hearings.
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through avenues of inquiry opened by what the state has
learned.1
43
This period is also critical in a system that relies so heavily on plea
bargaining and in which less than one percent of misdemeanors,
and five percent of felonies, go to trial.144 In New York, a prosecu-
tor can offer a plea bargain prior to filing an indictment or infor-
mation. If the defendant accepts the offer, the right to discovery
has yet to attach when he enters the plea.
145
Once an indictment or information is filed, discovery occurs in
three stages: 1) after filing of the indictment or information; 2) at
the pretrial hearing; and 3) at the trial. In fact, under New York's
discovery statute, a defendant is entitled to very little pretrial dis-
covery that advances the goal of investigation. Perhaps most im-
portantly, there is no statutory mechanism for discovery of the
names of likely prosecution witnesses.146 While defense counsel
might learn some of the names upon receiving discovery of the pre-
trial statements of intended trial witnesses, the prosecutor is not
obligated to turn these names over until after the jury is sworn. 147
In addition, there is no right to either the names or statements of
143. 1963 Brennan, supra note 5, at 287 (emphasis added). He was of course think-
ing more along the lines of fairness in the process and not a constitutional right, but
the norms with which we evaluate the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel have changed since that 1963 statement. Notably, the Supreme Court de-
cided Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), just days after Justice Brennan's
lecture.
144. Of the 52,711 felony arrests in New York State in 2002 that led to indictments,
only 2,681 defendants were convicted or acquitted at trial; of that same number of
arrestees, 45,878 pled guilty to some charge. See N. Y. STATE Div. OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SERVICES, DISPOSITION OF FELONY ARRESTS: NEW YORK STATE (2004), at
http://criminaljustice.state.n y.us/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/nys.htm. Of the 345,012 people
prosecuted for misdemeanors in lower courts in 1999 in New York State, only 2,499
were convicted or acquitted at trial. N. Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SER-
VICES, 1999 CRIME & JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT (2001), at http://criminaljus-
tice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojs a/cja_99/sec3/disp-misd.htm.
145. But see TRIAL MANUAL 5, supra note 16, § 182 (advising defense counsel to
complete an investigation even before the arraignment as pleas are often offered at
this stage, and noting "the need to be knowledgeable in bargaining").
146. See People v. Miller, 484 N.Y.S.2d 183, 184 (App. Div. 1984) (finding that
"[t]here is neither a constitutional nor statutory obligation mandating the pretrial dis-
closure of the identity of a prosecution witness"). The Miller court noted that disclo-
sure of prosecution witness identity was in the trial court's discretion. Id. (citing
People v. Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262 (1968)). The Court, however, went on to hold that
"simply assert[ing that] disclosure was necessary to prepare for trial" did not consti-
tute the type of "special circumstances" that a defendant must show to prove abuse of
discretion in denial of such disclosure. Id. at 185.
147. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45 (Mckinney 2004). For witnesses at any pre-
trial hearing, the prosecution is not obligated to turn over relevant statements until
after their direct testimony. §240.44.
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witnesses with information relevant to the case that the prosecu-
tion does not call at the hearing or trial, unless they constitute ma-
terial, exculpatory evidence.'14
The remainder of this section will return to the case of Jane
Smith mentioned in the Introduction and will walk through the dis-
covery process, highlighting two perspectives from which to con-
sider the availability of discovery under the New York statute:
substance and timing.14 9 The article will describe what information
a defendant gets, does not get, and when she gets it under the
statute.15o
Put yourself back into the shoes of the Legal Aid Society, Crimi-
nal Defense Division attorney in New York County Criminal
Court, who is representing Jane Smith. 51 As noted in the Intro-
duction, all you know from the arraignment file is that your client
is charged with Grand Larceny, accused by "a person known to the
District Attorney's office" of stealing $3,500 some three months
ago near the corner of Third Avenue and Twenty-third Street.
152
Your arraignment interview of Ms. Smith, a woman in her mid-
fifties, is brief for two reasons. First, Ms. Smith is innocent. She
cannot tell you anything about the charges other than to say she
was probably getting free lunch at a soup kitchen around 1 p.m. but
she is not sure because the date of the alleged crime is almost three
months ago. She does not remember the name of the soup kitchen
but gives you an approximate address and tells you she can take
you there. Second, she does not trust you, and you certainly can-
not gain her confidence with your knowledge of the case; you do
not know anything about the charges other than those couple of
sentences on that one piece of paper in that file.
148. See infra note 163 and accompanying text which discusses New York's codifi-
cation of the rule in Brady v. Maryland.
149. This article will not focus on all of the details of Article 240. For a comprehen-
sive discussion, see MARKS ET AL., supra note 124, at Chapter Seven.
150. Article 240 also provides for discovery from the defense, although as noted
infra at note 186, this article focuses only on the Sixth Amendment implications for
discovery from the prosecution for the defense.
151. Criminal Court is New York City's lower court for criminal matters, and has
jurisdiction over misdemeanors at all stages and over felonies only until the prosecu-
tion files a grand jury indictment. Thus, almost all defendants are initially arraigned
in Criminal Court, on cases ranging from jumping the turnstile to capital murder.
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over charges indicted by a grand jury. If a defendant
is indicted, the defendant is then arraigned in Supreme Court on that indictment. See
31 N.Y. JURIs 2D Crim. Law 235-37 (1995).
152. See copy of sample Criminal Court Complaint that fails to name complaining
witness on file with author.
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You tell the arraignment prosecutor that you are troubled about
the case and ask her to tell you something other than what is in the
Complaint (the name of the complainant, how the alleged theft
took place, the exact location where it happened), so you can look
into the charges further. The arraignment prosecutor is unwilling
to share any other information and the discovery statute does not
require disclosure: as noted above, Article 240 applies only to felo-
nies that have been indicted.153 The judge sets $1,000 bail in Ms.
Smith's case. Five days later, the grand jury indicts Ms. Smith and
she continues to be held on $1,000 bail. You have no idea who the
complainant is; your investigator is still searching for the soup
kitchen.
Two weeks after being indicted by the grand jury, your client is
arraigned on the indictment in Supreme Court. You may now seek
discovery directly from the prosecution under the statute. In re-
sponse to your discovery request, the prosecutor informs you that
you already have notice of the date, time, and place of the offense
and arrest,'154 and that none of the other items on the discovery-by-
demand list apply.'55 Ms. Smith did not make a statement, 56 nor
did she testify in the grand jury;1 57 there were no written reports of
scientific tests or medical examinations; 58 no photographs taken or
drawings made, other than Ms. Smith's arrest photo (and you can
153. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
154. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.20(1)(i) (McKinney 2004) (granting a right
to the "approximate date, time and place of the offense charged and of defendant's
arrest").
155. See § 240.20. The prosecutor has fifteen days to comply or refuse to comply
with defendant's demand, with extensions for "good cause." § 240.80 (2) (governing
timing of demand discovery). A major change to Article 240 in 1979 was that a defen-
dant no longer had to file a motion with the court requesting these items but could
seek them by written demand directly from the prosecutor. Id. commentary at 334. If
a prosecutor refuses to comply with the demand, the defendant can then move for a
court order of compliance with the original demand. See § 240.40.
156. § 240.20(1)(a), granting a right to:
"[any written, recorded or oral statement of the defendant, and of a co-
defendant to be tried jointly, made, other than in the course of the criminal
transaction, to a public servant engaged in law enforcement activity or to a
person then acting under his direction or in cooperation with him."
Id.
157. § 240.20(1)(b) (granting a right to the statement by the defendant, or any co-
defendant to be tried jointly with the defendant, before any grand jury).
158. § 240.20(1)(c) (granting a right to any written report on physical or mental
examination, or scientific test or experiment relating to criminal action, but only if the
prosecution intends to introduce it at trial or if it was made by or at request of law
enforcement or by a person the prosecutor intends to call at trial).
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look at that); 159 no property released back to its owner;16 ° no prop-
erty taken from Ms. Smith;'61 no electronic recordings the prosecu-
tor will use at trial, as the complainant walked into the precinct to
report the crime; 162 and, finally, there is-according to the prosecu-
tor, who has sole responsibility for deciding this issue at this
stage-no material exculpatory evidence.163
Notably absent from this post-indictment/pre-pretrial hearing list
of discoverable material are any police reports with witness state-
ments or names and addresses of prosecution witnesses.1 For Ms.
Smith, as for many defendants, this stage of discovery is fairly
meaningless even though it is called the "heart" of discovery in the
Commentary accompanying the statute. 65 Although you learn
that Mary Johnson is the complaining witness, her name is simply
too common to be useful in finding her.
Under the current New York discovery statute, the first opportu-
nity for meaningful information that might allow you to begin truly
159. § 240.20(1)(d) (granting a right to photographs and drawings relating to the
criminal action, but only if the prosecution intends to introduce it at trial or if it was
made by or at request of law enforcement or by a person the prosecutor intends to
call at trial).
160. § 240.20(1)(e) (granting a right to any photograph, photocopy or other repro-
duction made by or at the direction of the police, a peace officer or the prosecutor,
irrespective of whether the prosecutor intends to introduce the property or reproduc-
tion at trial).
161. § 240.20(l)(f) (granting a right to inspect property taken from the defendant
or a co-defendant to be tried jointly).
162. § 240.20(1)(g) (granting a right to "[any tapes or other electronic recordings
which the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial, irrespective of whether such record-
ing was made during the course of the criminal transaction").
163. § 240.20(1)(h) (granting a right to "[alnything required to be disclosed, prior
to trial, to the defendant by the prosecutor, pursuant to the constitution of [the State
of New York] or of the United States"). This section of the Criminal Procedure Law
codifies the constitutional right to material, exculpatory evidence enunciated in Brady
v. Maryland. See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text (discussing Brady
doctrine).
164. See supra note 146 (discussing the trial courts' discretionary power to order
disclosure of the identity of prosecution witnesses). The absence of a statutory mech-
anism for disclosure of witness names was not always the case in New York. For fifty
years between 1881 and 1936, the prosecutor was required to attach to the indictment
the names of prosecution witnesses who appeared in the grand jury. See Pretrial Dis-
covery I, supra note 124, at 6 (citing former Code of Criminal Procedure § 291); see
also JOHN F. O'MARA & D. BRUCE CREW, III, CRIMINAL DISCOVERY IN NEW YORK
STATE: SELECTED ISSUES 22 n.12 (1976). This discovery statute was repealed in 1936
in order to control a "prolific source of motions to dismiss the indictment." See Pre-
trial Discovery I, supra note 124, at 6 (quoting New York Commission on the Adminis-
tration of Justice, Second Supplemental Report, 1936 (Legislation Document 1936,
No. 80 at 20)). Until passage of the Criminal Procedure Law in 1971 there was no
statutory right to discovery in New York. See id.
165. § 240.20 commentary at 339.
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investigating Ms. Smith's case could come at the pretrial hearing.166
That hearing usually occurs just before trial. On average, it takes
about ten to twelve months after arrest for a felony case to go to
trial, although this time period is likely to be significantly shorter
for an incarcerated defendant. 167 At the hearing, the defendant has
the right to those portions of written statements of testifying wit-
nesses that relate to the subject matter of their pretrial testi-
mony.1 68 Although the statutory right applies only after the direct
testimony of the witness, 69 the prosecutor in Ms. Smith's case
turns over these materials outside the courtroom just before the
hearing begins.170 For Ms. Smith, there is a short hearing about the
166. See § 240.44 (governing discovery upon request at the pretrial hearing).
167. See Statistical table compiled by Dean Mauro, New York State Division of
Criminal Justice Services, Statistical Services Unit (May 10, 2004) (on file with au-
thor) (listing 324.5 as the median number of days from arrest to guilty verdict for New
York State defendants convicted of felonies and sentenced to prison or jail time in
2003, and a 351-day median for New York State defendants acquitted in felony trials
in 2003; for New York City, the medians are 359 for convictions and 378.5 for acquit-
tals). See also Lee, Indigent Defense, supra note 111, at 174 (noting that "[t]he aver-
age time from arrest to disposition for felony cases nation-wide is 214 days, with 90
percent of all felony cases resolved within one year of the date of arrest"). These
statistics do not separate incarcerated from non-incarcerated defendants but, in the
author's experience and based on conversations with Manhattan practitioners, the av-
erage time for such cases to get to trial would be about six to eight months.
168. See § 240.44(1). There is also a right to discover the criminal convictions and
existence of pending criminal actions against any pretrial witnesses, to the extent that
such information is known to the prosecution or defense. § 240.44(2) & (3). These
sections apply to both parties, so that the defendant must turn over all covered mate-
rial if he calls any witnesses at the pretrial hearing. This reciprocity holds true in the
section governing discovery for trial witnesses. See § 240.45(2). In addition, the pros-
ecutor has a more limited right to discovery upon demand in the period after the filing
of the indictment or information. See § 240.30.
169. See § 240.44 (stating that each party, at the conclusion of direct examination of
each of its witnesses, shall upon request of the other party make relevant materials
available to that party).
170. In practice, Manhattan prosecutors will usually turn over this discovery mate-
rial shortly before the hearing begins, at least in low-level felonies and misdemeanors.
Interestingly, prosecutors often do voluntarily disclose more information, earlier, in
the more serious cases. Judges often pressure prosecutors to turn the material over
before the hearing begins, to speed the process. From a systemic viewpoint, it is
highly inefficient to have a case ready to go except that defense counsel still has not
seen the discovery material. See supra notes 229-230 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing efficiency justification for broader discovery). Too often, however, the judge con-
siders the matter settled if defense counsel has some minimal time to simply read over
the materials. For example, in a "buy and bust" drug case, where the paperwork is
fairly uniform across cases, judges often express the view that defense counsel can
read the material over quickly and then return to it after the witness testifies. Judges
sometimes tell defense counsel that they will allow a re-opening of cross examination
if defense counsel discovers anything "meaningful" in the documents, without clarify-
ing the meaning of "meaningful." The problem with this method, of course, is that it
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identification procedure. One police officer testifies and the prose-
cution redacts the address of the complaining witness on the docu-
ments he turns over. You have no right to Mary Johnson's address
under the statute.17 1
Immediately after the pretrial hearing, jury selection begins.
Under the statute, you have a right to the prior statements and
criminal history of trial witnesses after the jury is sworn.'72  The
timing of discovery here is only slightly more generous than the
federal statute governing witness statements. Under the Jencks
Act, upon defense counsel's request, the government must turn
over portions of any prior recorded statements of a government
witness that relates to her trial testimony only after she testifies on
direct examination. 173 Courts do not have authority to order pre-
trial disclosure of such statements. 174 The Jencks Act is an excep-
tion to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibiting "the
discovery or inspection of ... statements made by prospective gov-
ignores the central role discovery plays in the investigatory function. If defense coun-
sel first learns the name or address of the complainant or other witnesses, or the
location from which a police officer watched a drug sale, at the pretrial hearing or just
before jury selection, then that might be the first point that counsel could seek to
investigate the issue. The request for a mid-hearing or mid-trial adjournment, how-
ever, is certainly not granted as a matter of course and-at least in New York
County-usually not granted at all. See generally Richard Klein, Relationship of the
Court & Defense Counsel: The Impact on Competent Representation & Proposals for
Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 540-47 (1988) [hereinafter Klein, Competent Representa-
tion] (detailing cases in which the court denied requests for continuances despite the
fact that defense counsel informed the court that they were unprepared to proceed
with trial).
171. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 616 N.Y.S.2d 501, 502 (App. Div. 1994) (denying
defendant's claim of a right to access complaining witness's phone number and
address).
172. § 240.45 (b) & (c); see also § 240.43 (stating that immediately before jury selec-
tion the prosecution must, upon demand, inform the defendant of any prior bad but
uncharged conduct of the defendant that the prosecutor intends to use at trial).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000). This is commonly known as "The Jencks Act," be-
cause Congress passed it in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Jencks v.
United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957) (holding that government must turn over all
reports of two government witnesses relating to events and activities to which they
testified at trial).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267, 1270 (2d Cir. 1974) (hold-
ing that district judge cannot compel government to turn over Jencks Act materials
until after direct examination of the relevant witness, but noting that the court "en-
courage[s] th[e] practice [of earlier, voluntary discovery] and believe[s] that it fre-
quently benefits not only a defendant, but the Government too, and that it may also
serve[s] the public interest in expediting the fair resolution of criminal cases"); see
also United States v. Steurer, 942 F. Supp. 1183, 1190 (N.D. Il. 1996) (holding that "a
defendant does not have a right to pretrial disclosure of Jencks material under the
Jencks Act. A district court may only order disclosure of such material after a witness
called by the government has testified on direct examination at trial").
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ernment witnesses." '175 Taken together, the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure and the Jencks Act are designed to ensure that
witness statements are available for impeachment purposes but not
to assist in defense counsel's investigation. This is, in essence, the
situation in New York.
This time, the judge in Ms. Smith's case rejects the prosecution's
attempt to redact the address of the complainant. But now you are
in the middle of a trial and the judge also rejects your request for
an adjournment. 176 You get a message to Ms. Johnson to please
call you. You visit her apartment that evening-when you should
be working on your upcoming cross-examinations of the remaining
prosecution witnesses, whose prior statements you have just re-
ceived-but she is not home. The next morning, Ms. Johnson testi-
fies as the main prosecution witness. Her direct testimony is brief:
she describes how she withdrew $3,500 from her bank and gave it
to Ms. Smith for a supposed joint enterprise that Ms. Smith pro-
posed to her after introducing herself to Ms. Johnson on a street
corner. Ms. Johnson testifies that Ms. Smith took the money and
never returned. You are careful in your cross examination because
you believe that the best argument you have on summation-com-
bined with the somewhat shaky alibi evidence, described just be-
low, that you were able to obtain-is that a jury should not rely,
beyond a reasonable doubt, on the identification abilities of any-
one who would hand $3,500 to a complete stranger.
The timing of the release of Ms. Johnson's name and address-
timing which made it impossible to contact her before she took the
stand-highlights a significant problem with discovery that comes
so late in the process: "[C]ross-examination, one of the most effec-
tive tools available to test the reliability of information, is effective
only to the degree that the cross-examining party has access to rel-
evant information and sufficient time with which to prepare to use
it."1 77 In addition, if the prosecutor disclosed information earlier in
175. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2); see also Rule 26.2(g) (allowing for inspection of
those portions of prior recorded statements of witness that relate to their testimony at
suppression, preliminary and several other types of hearings after direct testimony of
the witness at the hearing). Rule 26.2 applies to both sides, so that the defendant
must produce relevant recorded statements for any witnesses he calls at such hearings.
R. 26.2(a).
176. Due to enormous pressure upon trial courts to move their calendars, requests
for continuances are routinely denied. See Klein, Competent Representation, supra
note 170, at 540-47.
177. Berend, supra note 111, at 472 (emphasis added). The problems go deeper
than just those associated with cross-examination. California Supreme Court Justice
Roger Traynor, criticizing the restrictive federal discovery rule in 1964 for its lack of a
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the case, it could generate important investigative leads that de-
fense counsel might pursue.
About ninety-five percent of criminal cases end not with trials,
but in plea bargains.1 78 The claim of this article, that broad and
early discovery is necessary for the effective assistance of counsel,
applies with even more force to plea bargains because, in the plea
bargain context, inadequate investigation is even more widespread
and harder to detect. 179 This problem is rarely highlighted in the
case law, as many guilty pleas are never appealed and appeals that
do occur are often rejected under the stringent standards governing
the validity of plea bargains. 180 Certainly, there is a strong need for
information about the prosecution's case and possible defenses in
the plea bargain process.18'
Ms. Smith's trial illustrates the problem of late disclosure of in-
formation. During your cross-examination of Ms. Johnson, you ask
her about Peter Lee, whose name appears in the police reports.
She tells you that Mr. Lee is a friend of hers who arrived as she was
waiting, in vain, for Jane Smith to return. He did not see any part
of the incident, but he did go to the precinct with Johnson to report
the crime. Lee's address does not appear in any of the reports you
were given; the judge denies your request for his address and for
mechanism for discovery of names and addresses of witnesses, identified two
problems that all trial attorneys have faced:
The defense confronts many witnesses for the first time in the contentious
atmosphere of courtroom cross-examination, when the witness has already
allied himself with the prosecution and may have rehearsed his testimony
with the prosecutor. It is not easy to elicit impartial testimony from a wit-
ness under such circumstances. Moreover, the trial may run its course with-
out the defense's ever becoming aware of potential witnesses not called by
the prosecution.
Traynor, supra note 5, at 236; see also id. at 235 ("One familiar with the steady devel-
opment of criminal discovery in his own state [of California] for nearly a decade may
be permitted to note that pretrial discovery in the federal courts appears by compari-
son not only inadequate, but riddled with arbitrary rules").
178. See Criminal Case Proceedings Statistics, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
cases.htm (last revised on May 14, 2004) (noting, in summary findings on felony de-
fendants in state courts, that "[n]inety-five percent of convictions occurring within 1
year of arrest were obtained through a guilty plea").
179. See Clennon, supra note 16, at 670-71 ("Because courts require a defendant
pleading guilty to admit to the existence of a factual basis for the plea and to forego
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, counsel's fact investigation rarely, if ever, comes
under scrutiny" (footnotes omitted)); see also supra note 53.
180. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (stating requirement that
guilty pleas are valid if they are knowing, voluntary and intelligent); see also supra
note 43 (discussing the stringent standards for showing ineffective assistance where
the case ended in a guilty plea).
181. See supra note 111.
2004] INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
any other police reports relating to him, reasoning that, based on
Johnson's testimony, he has no relevant information.
You also learn, when you first see Ms. Johnson, that she is Asian-
American; your client is African-American. This is significant.
This is a one-witness identification case with no other evidence
against Ms. Smith and cross-racial identifications have been shown
to be particularly unreliable. 82 The judge denies your request for
an adjournment to find an expert witness who can testify about
cross-racial identifications.
After the prosecution rests, you present an alibi defense. Your
student intern found the soup kitchen a month earlier and some-
one who worked there knew your client and remembered that she
came in quite regularly at 1 p.m. for lunch. Unfortunately, the or-
ganization has a policy of discarding the sign-in sheets after one
month, so the defense is weak. As soon as you learned this infor-
mation, you filed with the court and served on the prosecutor a
notice of the alibi defense. 183 The statute governing such notice-
"the first inroad on the general rule that the defendant did not
have to disclose anything before trial"184-stands in stark contrast
to the prosecution's obligation to disclose information. If a defen-
dant in New York, as is the case in most other jurisdictions,8 5 in-
tends to put on an alibi defense, he must tell the prosecutor not
only of this intention, but must also provide the "place or places
where the defendant claims to have been at the time in question"
as well as "the names, the residential addresses, the places of em-
ployment and the addresses thereof of every such alibi witness
upon whom he intends to rely."' 86 Perhaps because the Constitu-
182. See ELIZABETH F. Lovrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 340-41 (3d ed. 1997); see
also Radha Natarajan, Note, Racialized Memory & Reliability: Due Process Applied
to Cross-Racial Eyewitness Identifications, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1821, 1822 & n.7-8
(2003) (citing social science research in support of statement that "[w]hile all eyewit-
ness identifications are prone to error, cross-racial eyewitness identifications are more
often wrong than same-race identifications").
183. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.20(1) (McKinney 2002) (stating that upon de-
mand of the prosecutor, defendant must file notice of alibi defense).
184. § 250.20 commentary at 125.
185. See. e.g., COL. REV. STAT. § 16-7-102 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-16-5(a)
(1997).
186. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.20(1). In Williams v. Florida, the Court first con-
sidered, and upheld, the constitutionality of pretrial discovery for the prosecution.
399 U.S. 78, 82 n.11 (1970) (noting that, "[in addition to (the] Florida [rule at issue],
at least 15 States appear to have alibi-notice requirements of one sort or another").
This article does not address the issue of discovery for the prosecution, other than to
make this comparative point about alibi notice, as the government has no Sixth
Amendment rights and thus the analytic framework proposed here does not apply.
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tion requires such reciprocity,187 this is the only part of the Crimi-
nal Procedure Law of New York State that requires the
prosecution to turn over witness names and addresses that the
prosecution proposes to offer in rebuttal to the alibi defense, al-
though "[a] witness who will testify that the defendant was at the
scene of the crime is not such an alibi rebuttal witness. ' 188 Discuss-
ing a precursor to the current notice of alibi statute, the New York
Court of Appeals stated:
The purpose of the statute was to prevent a defendant from ob-
taining acquittal of a crime of which he was guilty by calling a
number of witnesses to testify to a false alibi with no prior op-
portunity afforded to the District Attorney to make any investiga-
tion of them or their story.1 89
In other words, a presumption of guilt (and a subsequent lie to
escape the consequences of that guilt), led the court and legislature
to conclude that the prosecution must have full disclosure of all
relevant information to allow investigation.
The jury deliberates for four hours before convicting Ms. Smith.
She had been convicted of felony drug possession eight years prior;
consequently, she receives the minimum sentence of two to four
years in prison.190 During the appeals process, Ms. Smith's appel-
late attorney again requests and this time receives a police report
relating to Peter Lee. It confirms Ms. Johnson's trial testimony
that Mr. Lee saw nothing of the incident. As he did not testify, the
prosecution was not required to disclose the report at trial. The
report lists his address and phone number and the attorney calls
him. Mr. Lee confirms that he did not witness the incident but says
he spoke with Ms. Johnson about the case, in depth, as it
progressed. Ms. Johnson told him that she knew when she saw Ms.
Smith's photograph in the precinct photo book that she was the
right person because a "vision" came to her and made it all clear.
Also, it was hard to be sure about Ms. Smith before the moment of
187. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 (1973).
188. § 250.20(2).
189. People v. Rakiec, 45 N.E.2d 812, 813 (N.Y. 1942) (emphasis added); see also
People v. Ruiz, 419 N.Y.S.2d 864, 866 (Sup. Ct. 1999) ("The purpose of the alibi statu-
tory scheme is to afford the prosecutor an opportunity to thoroughly investigate the
merits of the alibi, for the alibi is one defense which is easy to manufacture"); see also
Williams, 399 U.S. at 81 (noting that "[gliven the ease with which an alibi can be
fabricated, the State's interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense is
both obvious and legitimate").
190. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06 (McKinney 1998) ("Sentence of Imprisonment
for Second Felony Offender").
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the vision because all black women of that age look the same to
her. Confronted with Lee's statement, Ms. Johnson confirms it.
Although Ms. Smith was already out on parole by this point, her
case was eventually dismissed. Ms. Smith spent two years in
prison. If there had been early discovery, her case may never have
gone to trial. At the very least, it is likely that she would have been
released on her own recognizance to await a trial in which defense
counsel could have used this critical information to test the reliabil-
ity of Ms. Johnson's identification of Ms. Smith.
The "Jane Smith" case illustrates how in some cases, including
those in which the accused is innocent of and knows nothing about
the charges against her, it is nearly impossible to undertake an in-
dependent factual investigation into the charges. Given the role
the presumption of innocence plays in our criminal justice system,
we should assume that the defendant cannot supply the necessary
information. 91 Even if a particular defendant is guilty or just has
information relevant to the charges, there are many other potential
obstacles to using the defendant as the primary source of informa-
tion for investigating a case. For example, a defendant might: not
know who the witnesses are or where to find them; distrust her
lawyer; be incarcerated (and thus unable to lead the attorney to
witnesses whose names she does not know); have poor recollection;
or suffer from mental health problems.192
In Wiggins, the deficient performance prong of the Strickland
test asked "whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision
not to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins's background was
itself reasonable.''193 The deficiency question in Jane Smith's case
would, in theory, ask whether defense counsel's total failure to in-
vestigate the case, other than for alibi purposes, was a reasoned,
strategic decision to forgo such investigation. But that cannot be
the question in Jane Smith's case-at least not until the wall of
restrictive discovery is torn down. Wiggins's and Jane Smith's at-
torneys faced very different challenges: Wiggins's attorneys had the
tools they needed to investigate mitigation at their disposal;
Smith's attorney did not. The facts necessary to develop mitigation
191. See 1963 Brennan, supra note 5, at 287 (noting that "[t]he implication in the
argument against discovery is that that accused is guilty," and asking: "is not such
denial [of all discovery] blind to the superlatively important public interest in the
acquittal of the innocent?").
192. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (acknowledging that
"[m]entally retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to
their counsel"); see also supra note 24.
193. Wiggins v. Smith, 123 U.S. 2527, 2536 (2003).
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evidence for a capital sentencing hearing come largely from
sources that are not within the prosecution's control: the defen-
dant, his family, his friends, and his medical, school, foster care,
and other records. There was no external obstacle keeping Wig-
gins's attorneys from investigating these sources; they simply failed
to do a competent job in looking into them.194
The fact investigation context is quite different. If an attorney
cannot get the information she needs to investigate from her client,
the question becomes: is the legislative decision to grant only re-
strictive discovery, late in the case, unconstitutional if it blocks the
ability of defense counsel to investigate the facts? In other words,
is the discovery statute a state-imposed barrier to the effective as-
sistance of counsel? Part B of this section takes a brief look at the
current state of constitutional law governing defense counsel's ac-
cess to information. Part III asks whether there remain any truly
legitimate reasons for restrictive discovery rules.
B. Constitutional Sources for Access to Information
The Supreme Court has praised the "salutary development" of
broad discovery' 95 and noted the fairness-enhancing value in rules
that allow "both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to
investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or in-
nocence."' 196 Despite recognizing "fairness in the adversary sys-
tem" as a core value of the Due Process Clause,197 the Court has
made it clear that "[t]here is no general constitutional right to dis-
covery in a criminal case."1 98 The Supreme Court has never re-
viewed a claim that a restrictive discovery rule violates the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Under Brady v. Maryland'99 and related cases, the Due Process
Clause mandates only disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment
194. By "no external obstacle," I mean that counsel had the information in front of
them and could decide what to do with it. See supra note 21 (noting how Wiggins's
attorneys had access to investigatory resources). In some cases, the defendant may
suffer from mental illness or other impairments which make it difficult for counsel to
obtain mitigation information, see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text, or the
defendant may be unwilling to have counsel speak with witnesses who might provide
mitigation evidence.
195. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
196. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1970).
197. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 474.
198. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977); see also United States v.
Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (noting that "the Constitution does not require the
prosecutor to share all useful information with the defendant").
199. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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evidence within the prosecutor's possession that is material to the
outcome of the case. °° This is not a right to pretrial discovery but
is instead a due process right to access information that is necessary
to ensure a fair trial.20 1 The Supreme Court has defined "material-
ity" stringently: as a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed, the outcome would have been different.20 2 Thus,
while claims of governmental failure to turn over Brady material
are common, one study found only 270 federal and state court
cases in the last forty years that had resulted in reversal of convic-
tion or a new hearing due to withheld Brady material. 0 3
200. Id.; see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999) (listing "three
components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the
accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence
must have been suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently; and
prejudice must have ensued"); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (noting that,
with respect to limitation to disclosure of evidence "within its possession," the govern-
ment is responsible for "any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police"); United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (holding that the prosecution's duty to disclose information en-
compasses impeachment as well as exculpatory evidence); United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 106-07 (1976) (finding Brady duty to disclose exculpatory evidence is applica-
ble even though there has been no request by the accused).
201. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629-31 (describing Brady as a "trial-related" right rather
than a right to discovery from the prosecution). With respect to such rights in the plea
bargain context, Ruiz held that, although the government must disclose impeachment
evidence for use at a trial, disclosure is not required prior to entering a plea bargain
with a defendant. Id. at 625. Ruiz did not address the question of whether the same
rule would apply to exculpatory evidence. In Ruiz, however, the Court noted that,
under the plea agreement at issue in that case, the defendant would have received
such exculpatory evidence prior to entering the plea. Id. Certainly, there is an argu-
ment to be made that failure to provide exculpatory evidence prior to a plea could
mean that the plea fails the constitutional requirements that it be knowing, intelligent
and voluntary. Id. at 629 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (2002)).
The claim would thus be based in the due process right to a knowing and voluntary
plea, rather than in the due process rights relating to fair trials set out in the Brady
line of cases. See also LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 24.3(b), at 1107 (noting that the ma-
jority of courts examining whether the government must turn over exculpatory evi-
dence prior to a plea bargain have found that there is such a responsibility).
202. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984)); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34.
203. Richard A. Serrano, Withheld Evidence Can Give Convicts New Life, L.A.
TIMEs, May 29, 2001, at Al (citing the Habeas Assistance and Training Project study);
see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296 (holding that petitioner satisfied Brady requirements
that the prosecution failed to disclose evidence and that the evidence was exculpatory,
but denying the claim because petitioner failed to show that there was a reasonable
probability that his conviction or sentence would have been different had the materi-
als been disclosed). Given its outcome-oriented materiality requirement, Brady of-
fers prosecutors very little incentive to turn over material. Indeed, the Brady line of
cases has been widely criticized as creating a pretrial right to just about nothing at all.
See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes & Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of
Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 643, 659 (2002) ("It is important ... to
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The Court has declined to use the Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion and Compulsory Process Clauses to decide pretrial access-to-
information claims. After noting that it "has had little occasion to
discuss the contours of the Compulsory Process Clause, '0 4 the
Court concluded that the clause would in any case provide no
greater right to discover favorable information than the Due Pro-
cess Clause. 20 5 A Confrontation Clause challenge to restrictions on
the right to discover information garnered a plurality for the pro-
position that the clause is only "designed to prevent improper re-
strictions on the types of questions that defense counsel may ask
during cross-examination, ' 20 6 and would not encompass access to
pretrial information.20 7 Rather, according to the plurality, analysis
of access to pretrial information properly fell under the well-estab-
lished due process test found in the Brady line of cases.20 8
The Court recognizes an informational power imbalance within
its due process analysis and has found that discovery must gener-
ally be a "two-way street,' 20 9 but it did so in the context of review-
ing a rule allowing for discovery for the prosecution from the
defense in the form of disclosure of an alibi witness list.210 Thus, a
state may require such discovery from the defense only if it allows
for reciprocal alibi discovery from the prosecution.1 This right to
recognize Brady as less of a discovery mechanism and as more of a post-trial due
process safety check where information surfaces after trial that exculpatory evidence
was suppressed").
204. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 55 (1987) (noting that, since the
Court's holding in United States v. Burr that Burr's compulsory process rights entitled
him to serve a subpoena on President Jefferson, "the Compulsory Process Clause
rarely was a factor in this Court's decisions during the next 160 years").
205. Id. at 56. For a comprehensive discussion of the Compulsory Process Clause,
including potential implications for discovery, see generally Peter Westen, Compul-
sory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV 71 (1974).
206. Ritchie, 480 U.S at 52 (plurality of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Pow-
ell, O'Connor, and White).
207. Id. at 53.
208. Id. at 53, n.9. Three justices in Ritchie rejected the plurality's view "that the
Confrontation Clause protects only a defendant's trial rights and has no relevance to
pretrial discovery." Id. at 61 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); see also id. at 66 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). In their view,
"the right of cross-examination also may be significantly infringed by events occurring
outside the trial itself, such as the wholesale denial of access to material that would
serve as the basis for a significant line of inquiry at trial." Id.
209. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973).
210. Id. at 471-72.
211. Id. at 476 ("It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the
details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise
concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he disclosed to the State").
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reciprocity, however, does not affirmatively require a state to
adopt rules allowing discovery from the prosecution. 12
The Supreme Court cases relating to discovery pose some obsta-
cles to this article's claim that the Right to Counsel Clause is the
appropriate framework for an analysis of certain pretrial discovery
claims. First, the Court has demonstrated a rather singular focus
on the Due Process Clause for analyzing access-to-information
claims. Second, the cases impose a high burden through the mate-
riality requirement. Third, their general language indicates an un-
willingness to analyze non-Brady discovery claims in a
constitutional framework. The Court's access-to-information
cases, however, fail to examine the critical link between restrictions
on discovery and defense counsel's constitutional duty to investi-
gate. They also pre-date the Court's recent Wiggins decision which
gives new meaning to that duty.2
13
One Supreme Court case that addresses the duty to investigate
and the right to effective assistance of counsel does recognize the
significance of discovery. In Kimmelman v. Morrison,214 trial coun-
sel "neither investigated, nor made a reasonable decision not to
investigate, the State's case through discovery. 2 1 5 Morrison's at-
torney's failure to request discovery was apparently driven by his
mistaken belief that the state had an obligation to inform him of its
case against his client-including the fact that law enforcement had
seized property from his client's home. Because of the failure,
counsel never filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence.216
The Court found that counsel's performance was constitutionally
deficient under the first prong of Strickland's ineffective assistance
of counsel test.217 The failure to investigate the merits of the sup-
212. Id. at 477-78.
213. See supra Part I.B (discussing Wiggins and the duty to investigate).
214. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
215. Id. at 385.
216. Id. at 368-69. Counsel also claimed that he did not seek discovery because he
had information that the complaining witness did not wish to go forward with the case
and he thought this meant that the case would not go to trial. Id. at 369.
217. Id. at 386. The Supreme Court first rejected the government's claim that the
restrictions on federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment issues announced in
Stone v. Powell should extend to Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claims if
those claims relate to the failure to appropriately litigate Fourth Amendment issues.
Id. at 373-83. After finding deficient performance, the Court remanded the case for a
determination with respect to the requirement that the defendant demonstrate that
counsel's deficient performance caused prejudice. Id. at 390-91. On remand, the dis-
trict court granted habeas relief and ordered a new trial. Morrison v. Kimmelman,
650 F. Supp. 801, 809-10 (D.N.J. 1986) (concluding that "the defense attorney's errors
dramatically affected the evidentiary picture in this case" and that "it is a least 'rea-
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pression issue was inexcusable because it was caused by the "total
failure to conduct pre-trial discovery." '218 This was true even
though defense counsel's trial performance was "generally credita-
ble enough. '219 Under Kimmelman, counsel's failure to seek dis-
covery was deficient performance because discovery was necessary
to ensure the ability to investigate. Although the case examines
defense counsel's failure to seek discovery, externally-imposed re-
strictive discovery rules result in the same deficient performance:
the inability to investigate. Surely the government cannot cause by
rule the very result that the Court in Kimmelman condemned.
In Kimmelman, the Court unambiguously understood the need
for discovery in order to undertake investigation into the case. It
also implicitly recognized that the client cannot be expected to pro-
vide all the information necessary for counsel's investigation. Even
though the government seized a sheet from Morrison's bed, and
even though a neighbor let the police into Morrison's apartment,
the Court noted, without challenging, defense counsel's assertion
that "he had not heard of the seizure until the day before, when
trial began, and that his client could not have known of it because
the police had not left a receipt for the sheet."220 The assumption
is that discovery of the relevant information in a timely enough
fashion would have alerted defense counsel to the need to under-
take the necessary investigation.
In Strickland, the Court also made the baseline assumption that
investigation must be based at least in part on access to informa-
tion from the prosecution. In articulating the constitutional stan-
dard for the duty to investigate, the Supreme Court adopted the
Court of Appeals' framework of informed strategic decision-mak-
ing.221 The Fifth Circuit opinion assumed that counsel will, at a
bare minimum, consult with his client and review the state's case-
by examining the state's evidence-before deciding upon a strat-
egy.222 The Supreme Court decision, similarly, described how lim-
its upon "time and money" can force early strategic decisions that
sonably probable' that but for the attorney's errors, the balance would have tilted in
favor of Morrison's version, and that he would have been acquitted").
218. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 386.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 369.
221. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) ("As the Court of Ap-
peals concluded, strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made
after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that rea-
sonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation").
222. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1254 (5th Cir. 1982).
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may be based only on client consultation "and a review of the pros-
ecution's evidence. '223 These acknowledgements are significant
because they assume that defense counsel has access to the prose-
cution's evidence before making strategic decisions; in other words,
they assume that the defendant has some modicum of discovery. 24
The absence of Supreme Court case law on the Right to Counsel
Clause in the Court's discovery jurisprudence could make the argu-
ment for a fresh look at discovery through such a lens a hard sell in
some quarters. But courts are becoming increasingly sensitive to
effective assistance claims, at least in death penalty cases. This
awareness should filter down to non-capital cases where the same
concerns about the need for effective assistance, the potential for
wrongful conviction without it, and general fairness in the adminis-
tration of criminal justice equally apply. If the duty to investigate
is to have the meaning that Wiggins seems to give it, 225 defense
counsel must have the tools she needs to investigate early in the
process. A right-to-counsel analysis of restrictive discovery is
squarely presented in the wake of Wiggins. If Wiggins signals that
"what was once a boilerplate ground for appeal has gained new
bounce, "226 then the courts can no longer ignore the relationship
between discovery, investigation, and the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel.
The next Part considers the major arguments against broad dis-
covery and demonstrates that they are either outdated, insignifi-
cant, or can be addressed within a system of broad discovery.
HI. THE DEBATE OVER LIBERAL DISCOVERY RULES
Arguments against broad discovery lack current validity. The
main purpose of pretrial discovery in criminal cases is to further
the overarching purpose of the criminal justice system: the search
for truth.227 The same reasoning is found in the cases defining the
right to counsel as the right to effective assistance of counsel: "The
223. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681.
224. One could argue that by "a review of the prosecution's evidence," the Strick-
land Court meant nothing more than an examination of the charging instrument. Id.
But surely such review allows for more than the paltry amount of information con-
tained in a typical indictment or complaint.
225. See supra Part I.B (discussing Wiggins and the duty to investigate).
226. John Council & Tony Mauro, 'Wiggins' Get Lower Courts' Notice, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 9, 2004, at 6.
227. See 1990 Brennan, supra note 5, at 2 (stating that "[t]he essential purpose of
permitting a criminal defendant to engage in pretrial discovery of the prosecution's
case is to enhance the truth-finding process so as to minimize the danger that an
innocent defendant will be convicted"); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,
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very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that par-
tisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ulti-
mate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go
free." '228 This could be called the fairness, or the justice rationale,
for discovery.
There are other, more practical reasons for discovery, as outlined
in a prosecutor's amicus brief filed in support of a defendant's re-
quest for broader discovery rights:
Under the present system in civilized communities where coun-
sel is informed of the real strength of the Commonwealth's case,
he is better enabled to give the proper advice to his client and
trials are shortened, issues are met more fairly, guilty pleas are
very often made, particularly in homicide cases, and the admin-
istration of justice is not only speeded up but made more fair
and exact.229
The state interest in shorter trials or quicker pleas might be called
the efficiency rationale for discovery. It is the primary impetus be-
hind many prosecutors' support of broad discovery.230
A third rationale for broad discovery is that it ameliorates the
resource imbalance between state and defendant. Justice Brennan,
after noting a systemic interest in evenly-balanced scales in the
contest between often indigent defendants and the state, posits dis-
covery as "one tool whereby [defendants] would have a better
chance to meet on more equal terms what the state, at its leisure
and without real concern for expense, gathers to convict them."'231
Discovery was not always recognized as an important tool in ad-
vancing these goals. Drawing upon English precedent prohibiting
pretrial discovery, 232 the early American common-law rule was that
655-56 (1984) (fairness in the adversary process gives meaning to the Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel).
228. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975). Justice Brennan, in describing
the latter half of this goal, has called it the "superlatively important public interest in
the acquittal of the innocent." 1963 Brennan, supra note 5, at 287.
229. 1963 Brennan, supra note 5, at 283 n.10 (quoting Di Joseph Petition, 145 A.2d
187 (Pa. 1958)).
230. See Traynor, supra note 5, at 237 (noting how some federal prosecutors volun-
tarily disclose information to defense counsel to both expedite trials and also because
such disclosure "in some cases has convinced the defense of the strength of the prose-
cution's case and thereby induced a plea of guilty" (citation omitted)); see also 1990
Brennan, supra note 5, at 2 (remarking that the essential purpose of discovery is to
advance truth-seeking goal but plea bargaining is the main impetus for discovery).
231. 1963 Brennan, supra note 5, at 286 (citations omitted).
232. See Rex v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792) (finding that defendant's
pretrial request to inspect a report of witness accounts was without principle and pre-
cedent and that to grant it "would subvert the whole system of criminal law"). The
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courts did not have the inherent authority to order such discovery
in criminal cases.2 33 By the late 1940s, a majority of states allowed
pretrial discovery.234 At the same time, the liberalization of civil
discovery took place, resulting in each side getting full pretrial ac-
cess to the other side's information.235 While the success of the
civil discovery experiment led to calls for broader discovery in the
criminal arena,236 opposition to such a parallel liberalization was
substantial. 37 Thus, during the 1950s and 1960s "there oc-
curred ... one of the classic debates in the field of criminal proce-
dure. '' 238 While most states have significantly broadened pretrial
Holland court noted that the practice was instead to allow inspection of the evidence
at "the hour of trial." Id. at 1250. With respect to witness statements, New York
follows the practice as it was in 1792: the right to discover statements of trial witnesses
attaches only after the jury is sworn. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.45 (McKinney
2002); see also supra notes 124 & 146 and accompanying text (discussing New York
law on discovery of witness statements). Professor Wigmore later questioned the
American courts' characterization of the English rule as absolute, taking the position
that the prohibition was a rule of policy rather than power. Many states came to
accept this position, which resulted in recognition of the trial court's power to order
pretrial discovery as an exercise of its inherent authority to control the trial process.
See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 1859g, 1863 (cited in People ex rel Lemon v. Supreme
Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 31 (1927)); LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 20.1, at 910-11.
233. See, e.g., People ex rel Lemon v. Supreme Court, 156 N.E. 84, 84-86 (N.Y.
1927) (Cardozo, J.) (detailing English common law prohibition on pretrial discovery
and application of that rule in American courts); see also Michael Moore, Criminal
Discovery, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 865, 866 (1968) ("American courts readily picked up the
doctrine of Rex v. Holland, to the effect that they were without power, absent legisla-
tion, to order the prosecutor to divulge evidence which he had in his possession").
But see TRIAL MANUAL 5, supra note 16, § 265 (noting that the frequent observation
that the common law allowed no discovery "is not strictly accurate," as the courts
had-at least since United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (C.C.D. Va.
1807)-discretionary power to compel production of materials, although this "power
was seldom used before the second half of the twentieth century" and was even de-
nied in some recent decisions).
234. See LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 20.1, at 910.
235. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. PROC. 26; LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 20.1, at 910.
236. Lemon, 156 N.E. at 86 (noting, in describing call for application of civil case
rules of evidence to criminal cases: "The appropriation is justified, we are told, by the
germinal developments of a like power in the courts of other States, by the public
policy implicit in the rule of uniformity of evidence . . . and by the necessities of
justice").
237. 1963 Brennan, supra note 5, at 283 (listing several states as having "made
strides" in the liberalization of pretrial discovery in criminal cases but noting that "by
and large the states are still unreceptive"); id. at 288 (stating that "rigid opposition to
pretrial criminal discovery for the accused still persists").
238. LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 20.1, at 911. The crux of the debate is captured in a
seminal lecture published in 1963 called, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event Or
Quest For Truth?. See 1963 Brennan, supra note 5. Justice Brennan poses the ques-
tion: "Should we extend to criminal prosecutions the civil pretrial discovery tech-
niques which force both sides of a civil law suit to put all cards on the table before
trial, and tend to reduce the chance that surprise or maneuver, rather than truth, may
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discovery in criminal cases since this debate,239 the arguments on
both sides are very much alive in jurisdictions that have resisted
liberalization. The sections below will describe the three main ar-
guments against discovery, and address why these arguments are
largely without merit.2 4 °
A. The Witness Interference Argument
The most common argument against broad discovery is that al-
lowing the defendant access to information about witnesses will
lead to interference with those witnesses. The claim is that the de-
fendant will try to convince potential prosecution witnesses to ei-
ther change their testimony or not testify at all, by bribing,
threatening, physically injuring, or even killing them.24' A more
determine the outcome of the trial?" Id. at 279. In answering this question affirma-
tively (although not based on constitutional considerations), Justice Brennan de-
scribed and then pointed out flaws in the major arguments against broader discovery.
Id. at 289-293. The New Jersey Supreme Court articulated these arguments in State v.
Tune, a decision in which Justice Brennan-then sitting on that court-was in the
minority. See State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1953). For other commentary and
case law surrounding the debate, see generally Traynor, supra note 5, at 249 ("Valua-
ble though discovery has proved in clarifying issues and expediting their trial, it has
yet to overcome the usual resistance of those who are set in old ways"). See also
United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (containing Learned
Hand's condemnation of discovery in criminal cases); Abraham S. Goldstein, The
State & the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L. J. 1149
(1960); David W. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CAL.
L. REV. 56 (1961).
239. See supra notes 5-10 & 119-127 and accompanying text (giving overview of
spectrum of discovery rules currently in place in the United States); see also Milton C.
Lee, Criminal Discovery: What Truth Do We Seek?, 4 U.D.C. L. REV. 7, 8 (1998)
[hereinafter Lee, What Truth?] (noting that approximately thirty-seven states have
discovery statutes that are more progressive than the restrictive federal model); Tray-
nor, supra note 5, at 229 (writing in 1964 and noting that "the trend is toward liberal-
izing discovery").
240. The Tune court actually described four arguments against discovery. Id. The
fourth is that the positive experience the British have had with broader discovery is
no model for our less law-abiding country. See 1963 Brennan, supra note 5, at 293
(describing argument that says: "the experience of other nations there broad discov-
ery has not subverted the criminal law, notably England and Canada, does not help
us" because we are a less law-abiding people and crime is increasing at a greater rate
in this country than in those). This article does not address this point, as it was largely
a response to defense counsel's argument in Tune and is generally not repeated in the
discovery literature.
241. A commonly-cited source for this argument is a Justice Department represen-
tative's testimony, during the 1974-75 congressional hearings on proposals to amend
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that disclosure of government witness
names would be "dangerous and frightening in that government witnesses and their
families will even be more exposed than they now are to threats, pressures, and physi-
cal harm." H.R. REP. No. 94-247, at 41 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 674,
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subtle, but much more compelling, argument is that of the poten-
tial chilling effect that mere knowledge of disclosure will have on
witnesses; the claim is that this knowledge may prevent witnesses
from cooperating with the prosecution or even from coming for-
ward in the first instance. 42
This argument is flawed, however, in its assumption that restric-
tive discovery is the only-or the best-way to prevent witness in-
terference. For example, in the great majority of drug cases, which
make up more than one-third of federal prosecutions, there are no
civilian witnesses.243 With a very few exceptions, police officers
and other government officials do not need protection against in-
timidation or the chilling effect.244 When necessary, there are ways
to protect against intimidation or the chilling of non-governmental
witnesses within a system of broad discovery. A protective order
blocking the identity of a particular witness, based on a showing
that such protection is necessary, is a device already used in both
civil and criminal practice.245 Another approach would disclose the
712. During subcommittee hearings, prosecutors "cited and documented hundreds of
instances in virtually every judicial district in the United States where, under existing
Rules, government witnesses are murdered, threatened or suborned to commit per-
jury." Id.; see also supra note 126 (describing proposed amendments to federal dis-
covery rules).
242. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-247, at 41; William Glaberson, Man Acquitted of a
Murder in Brooklyn: Case Raised Allegations of Witness Intimidation, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 2003, at B1 (describing case "that highlighted the dangers of witness intimida-
tion and New Yorkers' often unspoken fears about cooperating with law enforcement
officials").
243. In the period from Oct. 1, 2000 to Sept. 30, 2001, 36.7% of the cases prose-
cuted in the United States District Courts were drug related. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2001, at
10 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/fccp01.htm. While there
might be civilian confidential informants in some drug cases, the government can seek
a protective order where necessary.
244. Undercover agents might be an exception although for reasons other than a
chilling effect, such as not blowing their cover. There might also be concern in large-
scale drug cases, or drug cases that also involve charges of a violent crime, but these
will be a small minority of drug cases and can be dealt with by protective order.
245. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (allowing for protective orders in civil case
discovery); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.50 (McKinney 2002) (allowing for protective
orders in discovery process in criminal cases); see also Louisell, supra note 238, at 100
(suggesting that discovery law "draw the line between typical, and organized, crime"
and proposing that "[i]n the usual criminal case, the norm would be discovery as full-
fledged as that which now characterizes civil litigation" but restricting or even with-
holding discovery in cases where the prosecution has made an appropriate showing of
need based on the "nature of the accused's associations and representatives"); Tray-
nor, supra note 5, at 250 ("If the prosecution has assurance of secrecy upon a showing
of circumstances to justify it, there would be little objection to full pretrial disclosure
to the defense when there is no reasonable basis for secrecy").
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information to defense counsel without disclosing it to the defen-
dant and prohibit defense counsel from doing so.24
6
Further, "[t]he concerns regarding witness intimidation.., have
been refuted by the experience of the states. '247 In Florida, a state
with broad discovery that allows for depositions of certain prosecu-
tion witnesses, the state Supreme Court commissioned a study
which recognized infrequent, yet serious cases, of witness intimida-
tion but noted that both public defenders and prosecutors agreed
that this was not the result of the broader discovery process.248 The
Commission recommended retaining a defendant's right to depose
government witnesses. 249 Another study found that, in four cities
with broad discovery rules, there was no causal link between open
discovery and witness intimidation. In short, "the proper re-
sponse to the intimidation problem cannot be to prevent discovery
altogether; it is rather to regulate discovery in those cases in which
it is thought that witness intimidation is a real possibility. '251
The potential for a chilling effect is harder to cure even with the
availability of protective orders and other such measures. As
noted above, however, broad discovery states have not felt the
need to revert back to a more restrictive rule. A chilling effect is
also inherent in criminal cases in ways unrelated to discovery, be-
cause the witness may have to testify in the grand jury, at a pretrial
hearing, or at trial. Whether the defendant has access to witness
information is unlikely to add considerably to this burden. Absent
246. See Lee, What Truth?, supra note 239, at 25 ("The Florida experience [with
broad discovery] suggests that witness intimidation can be minimized by disclosing
information to the attorney without disclosing it to the accused"). While this ap-
proach can pose problems with respect to the attorney-client relationship, it could be
a last-resort tactic preferable to denial of discovery.
247. Id. at 23.
248. Id. (describing Florida Supreme Court's 1988 Commission on Criminal Dis-
covery report).
249. Id.
250. See W.M. Bradford Middlekauff, What Practioners Say About Broad Criminal
Discovery Practice, CRIM. JUST. Spring 1994, at 14, 58, stating that:
In some cities with broad discovery practice, such as San Diego, Philadel-
phia, Detroit, and Newark, prosecutors saw no significant causal link be-
tween discovery and witness intimidation. In Los Angeles and Chicago, on
the other hand, prosecutors acknowledged that there might be some link
between discovery and witness intimidation but noted that there were suffi-
cient methods available to protect witnesses. Even in these cities, there was
not a strong view that currently [sic] broad disclosure rules should be made
more limited.
251. 1990 Brennan, supra note 5, at 14; see also People v. Andre, 375 N.E.2d 758,
762 (N.Y. 1978) (noting "[tihe availability of a legal arsenal of protection" should
there be legitimate concern regarding witness intimidation).
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a particularized showing, this concern should not be allowed to
trump a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.
B. The Perjury Argument
Some have argued that a defendant accorded broad discovery
will use his knowledge of the prosecution's case to fashion perjured
testimony. The claim is that the defendant will tailor his own testi-
mony to ensure minimal conflict with the prosecution's case and
construct an entire defense that refutes the prosecutor's evidence.
This same justification was used historically to deny a defendant
the right to produce any witnesses at all. 52 It assumes the defen-
dant is guilty and is willing to commit another crime to be acquit-
ted. It also assumes that defense counsel will conspire with the
defendant to commit the perjury.253 The denial of discovery does
not solve the problem-if there is one-because the defendant sits
through the prosecution case before he or any witnesses he chooses
to call would testify which gives him ample opportunity to tailor
testimony should he so choose. Similar concerns that were raised
with respect to broader civil discovery proved unfounded and juris-
dictions with broad criminal discovery have not found perjury to be
a problem. 54
C. The Two-Way Street, or Reciprocity, Argument
Opponents of broad pretrial discovery argue that it will give de-
fendants an unfair advantage to give them prosecution material be-
cause the defendant's constitutional rights protect her from having
to reciprocate. In United States v. Garsson, Judge Learned Hand
stated:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not
disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from
question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted
when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the
twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole
252. See 1963 Brennan, supra note 5, at 291; cf. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605,
612-13, 607 (1972) (finding state rule that a defendant must testify first or not at all
unconstitutional, and noting that the concern behind such rules was defendant
perjury).
253. 1963 Brennan, supra note 5, at 291-92.
254. See LAFAVE, supra note 8, § 20.1, at 912.
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evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his
defense, fairly or foully, I have never been able to see. 55
First, this argument is to a great extent outdated, due to the pas-
sage of a number of statutes and court rules that require defend-
ants to turn information over to the state. Alibi notice, which
usually requires a list of alibi witnesses, is the most common exam-
ple; 256 some states go well beyond this and require defendants to
share their full witness lists with the prosecution. 257 Second, the
government has a huge investigatory power advantage and it is
highly unlikely that the vast majority of defendants can tactically
overwhelm it.258 In striking down a state law requiring defendants
to give notice of alibi without requiring reciprocal discovery from
the government, the Supreme Court noted that "the State's inher-
ent information-gathering advantages suggest that if there is to be
any imbalance in discovery rights, it should work in the defendant's
favor. 
259
In sum, the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel requires broad discovery, and there is no strong practical
argument against it.
CONCLUSION
There is perhaps no function of defense counsel more critical
than investigation of the prosecution's case and of possible de-
fenses. The vast majority of cases never go to trial, so while coun-
255. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (D.C.N.Y. 1923) (denying defen-
dant's motion to inspect the grand jury minutes and commenting that "[o]ur proce-
dure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an
unreal dream").
256. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83 (1970) (upholding constitutional-
ity of notice-of-alibi rules applied to defendant); see also supra notes 183-189 and
accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 413(d) (West 2004) which requires:
Subject to constitutional limitations and within a reasonable time after the
filing of a written motion by the State, defense counsel shall inform the State
of any defenses which he intends to make at a hearing or trial and shall
furnish the State with the following material and information within his pos-
session or control: ... (i) the names and last known addresses of persons he
intends to call as witnesses, together with their relevant written or recorded
statements, including memoranda reporting or summarizing their oral state-
ments, [and] any record of prior criminal convictions known to him.
258. See Traynor, supra note 5, at 229 (stating that "the protection afforded the
defendant against discovery is in large measure counterbalanced by the abundant re-
sources for investigation available to the prosecution").
259. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 476 n.9 (1973). But see id. at 480 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) ("Much of the Bill of Rights is designed to redress the advantage that
inheres in a government prosecution. It is not for the Court to change that balance").
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sel's performance in the courtroom is certainly important, it is
counsel's performance in the preparation of cases-leading up to
the much more likely result of a plea bargain-that really mat-
ters. 6° Yet in addressing inadequate investigation, courts and com-
mentators have failed to ask a critical question: does defense
counsel have the tools that she needs in order to fulfill her Sixth
Amendment duty to investigate? If we truly value the presump-
tion of innocence and we recognize the reality that many defend-
ants are not equipped to provide their attorneys with the
information needed for an effective investigation, then the role of
discovery in the investigatory process is clear. The highly restric-
tive discovery that exists in a significant number of jurisdictions
constitutes government interference with the effective assistance of
counsel.
Recognizing that restrictive discovery can lead to a violation of
the Sixth Amendment raises at least two important issues. First is a
question of institutional competence: should the legislature or the
courts change constitutionally defective discovery rules? 261 Sec-
ond, assuming that a court is faced with a defendant's claim of a
Sixth Amendment violation due to restrictive discovery, how might
that court analyze such a claim? It is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle to explore fully the various remedies that might resolve the
Sixth Amendment infirmities of a restrictive discovery rule. A rule
of open file discovery, however, in which the prosecution literally
opens its file for inspection by defense counsel (with the exception
of work product and subject to the ability to seek protective or-
ders) would cure the unconstitutionality of any governmentally-im-
260. See supra notes 178-181 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
discovery in the plea bargain context).
261. At first blush, it appears that the legislature is the institution best suited to
write discovery rules. It has the relevant expertise, for example, to consider the eco-
nomic consequences of different potential discovery rules and to consider the rules in
light of the whole body of Criminal Procedure Law. Unfortunately, legislatures do
not always act to protect constitutional rights, and certainly do not always do so when
those in need of protection are defendants in criminal cases-a group lacking in polit-
ical power. See Alec C. Ewald, Civil Death: Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disen-
franchisement Law in the United States, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1045, 1054 n.23 (2002)
(noting that all but two states have some type of disenfranchisement law, ranging
from loss of the vote during incarceration only to indefinite loss of the right for some
offenders); see also Donald Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the The-
ory of Public Choice, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1081 (1993) (using public choice
theory to consider the failure of legislatures to protect constitutional criminal rights).
At the very least, a court that grants a defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge to a
discovery statute will of necessity be the institution to consider the appropriate rem-
edy for that violation, at least with respect to that one case before the court.
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posed discovery obstacle to the ability to investigate.262 The
remedy of open file discovery would be prophylactic, in the sense
that it would be a "risk-avoidance rule[ ] ... not directly sanctioned
or required by the Constitution, but ... adopted to ensure that the
government follows constitutionally sanctioned or required
rules. 263 As such, it would be consistent with other rules of crimi-
nal procedure: "Constitutional criminal procedure is rife with pro-
phylactic rules. ' 2 4
A rule of open file discovery would have the great benefit of
avoiding an unworkable system of case-by-case inquiry into indi-
vidual restrictive discovery claims, a method that is likely to lead to
underenforcement of the right to effective assistance.265 In addi
tion, the costs of open file discovery are very low. As discussed in
Part III, the three major arguments historically advanced in oppo-
sition to broader discovery rules lack validity. While there may be
administrative costs to open file discovery, since such a rule will
lead to more discovery generally and to discovery in cases with
early plea bargains in which it may not have otherwise occurred,
there will be a corresponding savings in the probability that pleas
will happen earlier if the defendant has an opportunity to view the
262. It would cure the problem in the sense of removing the unconstitutionally re-
strictive rule. Still, even under a rule of open file discovery the ability to adequately
investigate would turn in part on the extent to which the prosecution exercised dili-
gence and good faith in seeking out information early in the case, and in turning over
later information as it is acquired. See generally Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 275
(1999) (despite open file policy of prosecutor, defense counsel never received excul-
patory evidence because the critical documents "were not in the file [the prosecutor]
made available to petitioner" and the prosecuting attorney "never saw" the docu-
ments "until long after" the trial). While a full discussion of the issues surrounding
open file discovery is beyond the scope of this article, with proper safeguards such a
rule would lift impediments to the right to effective assistance of counsel.
263. Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: Uses and Limits of
Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 926 (1999) (stating that prophylactic rules
"are directed against the risk of noncompliance with a constitutional norm").
264. See Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulation Prophylactic Rules, Safe
Harbors, & Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1030, 1037 (2001); see also Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of "Pro-
phylactic" Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001) (arguing that there is no real differ-
ence between such rules and "run-of-the-mill judicial doctrines routinely constructed
by the Court that we unquestionably accept as perfectly legitimate exercises of judi-
cial power").
265. The Supreme Court recently affirmed its rejection of the case-by-case inquiry
as the sole method for evaluating the voluntariness of custodial confessions. In Dick-
erson v. United States, the Court noted that its abandonment of the traditional case-
by-case inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding a confession in
favor of the prophylactic Miranda warning rule was necessary to avoid a "risk of over-
looking an involuntary custodial confession . . . that the Court found unacceptably
great .... 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
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government's evidence.266 In short, the high benefits and low costs
to the prophylactic rule of open file discovery make such a remedy
particularly appropriate to cure Sixth Amendment violations re-
sulting from restrictive discovery.
Restrictive discovery claims should be analyzed in light of a de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel. With broad discovery, in the form of a rule that gives
counsel the tools they need to adequately investigate their cases,
the Jane Smiths of our criminal justice system would not have to
suffer the injustice of spending two years in prison for a criminal
act they did not commit.
266. Indeed, prosecutors often cite a more efficient plea bargain system as a pri-
mary motivating force behind voluntary broad discovery. See supra notes 229-230 and
accompanying text.
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